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INTRODUCTION
International legal experts are calling on the Obama administration
to prosecute officials of the previous administration for authorizing tor-
ture. They argue that it is the international obligation of the United States
to investigate abuses and possibly also to prosecute officials who author-
ized the torture of detainees in the War on Terror.' Around the same time
that controversial "interrogation techniques" were being permitted and
practiced by the United States, in the French town of Outreau thirteen
individuals accused of child molestation spent sixteen to thirty-nine
months in prison before being released when the key witness admitted
that she had invented the whole story.2
There is a connection between these two seemingly unrelated events.
They both reflect the great concern with the rights of victims increas-
ingly reflected in domestic and more recently international law.
Although the calls for the prosecution of high-ranking U.S. officials for
torture illustrate potential benefits of this rising concern for victims'
1. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES 177 (2008); Jane Mayer, The Bush Six, NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009, at 23.
On the ill-treatment of some terror suspects see INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC],
ICRC REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN "HIGH VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CUS-
TODY 8-18 (2007), available at http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2009); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SPECIAL REVIEW No.
2003-7123-IG: COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEM-
BER 2001-OCTOBER 2003) (2004), available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.comcia-oig-
report.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2009); GEN. COUNSEL OF THE NAVY, MEMORANDUM FOR IN-
SPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL INVOLVEMENT IN INTERROGATION ISSUES, NAVIG Memo 5021 Ser 00/017 (2004),
available at http://www.newyorker.conimages/pdf/2006/02/27/moramemo.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2009).
2. Craig S. Smith, French Pedophilia Case Falls Apart when Main Suspect Recants,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A5. In this case, one of the accused individuals improperly
committed suicide and many lost custody of their children. Id.
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rights, the judicial witch-hunt against a large number of people in
France-a country with established rule of law-suggests that there are
also serious problems with it.
In the age of terrorism, human rights law globally suffers substantial
setbacks.3 However, at the regional level, human rights law is now more
relevant than ever. More cases are decided each year by regional human
rights tribunals, particularly in Europe.4 More importantly, human rights
law affects more areas of domestic legal systems than ever before-from
trademark law5 to limits on corporal punishment of children.6 This grow-
ing complexity presents two challenges: first, the challenge of
comprehension (or the increasing need to make sense of the ever-
expanding case law in many substantive areas) and second, the challenge
of responsibility (or the fact that human rights tribunals can no longer be
viewed as merely delivering justice in individual cases).
This Article considers these challenges in two areas of human rights
law seeing particularly fast growth: the rights of victims and accountabil-
ity for gross human rights violations. Recent case law of two regional
human rights courts has recognized a right of citizens to be protected
from criminal attacks and, at least in certain cases, a right to have the
perpetrators of such attacks criminally punished. This Article asks how
these developments might influence domestic criminal justice systems'
jurisprudence and human rights law's overall message.
It has long been a tradition in criminal justice theory to conceptual-
ize developments in criminal law in terms of models of criminal process.
Although much criticized,' Herbert Packer's two models of criminal
3. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Opinion, Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/05/opinion/is-the-
human-fights-era-ending.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (suggesting that the heightened ter-
rorist threat has undermined governments' rhetorical and actual commitment to human rights
protections).
4. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered 1,503 judgments in 2007.
See ECTHR, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 147 (2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
NRlrdonlyres/59F27500-FD I B-4FC5-8F3F-F289B4AO3008/0AnnuaRepor_2007.pdf (last
visited Oct. 4, 2009).
5. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 830
(2007); see also Laurence R. Heifer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PRop. REv. 47, 47-48 (2003).
6. A. v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2692.
7. Significantly, the long-term effects of the cases decided today should be considered.
In attempting to create remedies for victims of state-sponsored crime in particular cases, these
courts may have undermined their more traditional commitment to due process for criminal
defendants. See Part III infra (discussing cases).
8. See, e.g., Stuart MacDonald, Constructing a Framework for Criminal Justice Re-
search: Learning from Packer's Mistakes, I I NEW CRIM. L. REv. 257 (2008).
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process-his "due process" and "crime control" models 9-still retain
validity and explanatory power. His due process model regards
protection of the rights of the accused as the first priority of criminal
law, even at the expense of efficiency in the criminal justice system. The
crime control model, by contrast, prioritizes efficiency and speed in
criminal procedure, with the goal of ensuring that criminal sanctions ap-
ply expeditiously to the guilty.'0
Packer's models and their implications have traditionally been the
province of criminal justice academics, while developments in interna-
tional human rights law have been mostly tracked by international
lawyers." Today the continuing separation of criminal justice theory and
international human rights law theory is increasingly difficult to justify.
Jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals is, in many cases,
given direct effect in the domestic legal systems of participating
states' 2-that is, victims' rights jurisprudence can be and is in fact ap-
plied by some domestic criminal courts.'3
9. Packer's framework was first proposed in Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
10. Id. at 10.
11. In general, discussion of many criminal-justice-related problems, such as the role of
victims, has been separate and distinct from human rights discourse, even though human
rights law, particularly in Europe and the Americas, increasingly addresses such matters. See
JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIMS' RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: RECONCEIVING
THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES (2008) (criticizing the present lack of communication between
the two areas of theory and practice and using human rights language to discuss the status of
victims in the criminal justice system).
12. For example, the judgments of the European and the Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights can be used to interpret and even invalidate domestic legislation in some of
these courts' member states. See, e.g., GORDON ANTHONY, UK PUBLIC LAW AND EUROPEAN
LAW 157-78 (2002); Leonardo G. Filippini, Argentina, in VICTIMAS SIN MORDAZA: EL IM-
PACTO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO EN LA JUSTICIA TRANSICIONAL EL LATINOAMtRICA: LOS
CASOS DE ARGENTINA, GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR Y PERti 101, 108 (M6nica Avila ed., Ga-
briela Infs Haymes trans., 2007) (describing the supremacy of Inter-American human rights
law in Argentina); Laurence R. Heifer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 125, 135-36 (2008); Georg Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of
the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal Order, 40 Tax. INT'L L.J. 359,
359-61 (2004) (discussing the constitutional status of the judgments of the European Court in
Germany).
13. See generally BEN EMMERSON ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
741-84 (2d ed. 2007). For numerous examples of English courts applying in the domestic
context the guarantees for victims of crime provided in the Convention for Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, see DOAK, supra note 11, at 45-47, 172-75, 177-79
(citing Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]). For examples of
domestic courts applying the Inter-American jurisprudence, see Corte Suprema de Justicia de
la Naci6n [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Simon, Julio Hdctor y otros s/privaci6n ilegftima de la libertad,
etc.," Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (2005-328-2056) (Arg.),
available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/jurisprudencia.html; Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal
[Vol. 31:157
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This Article considers what values and basic choices the recent, vic-
tim-oriented international law imposes upon domestic criminal justice
systems. In doing so, it looks at developments in the victims' rights and
accountability jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals
through the prism of Packer's models and, to a lesser extent, other mod-
els of criminal process developed in response to Packer.
In doing so, the Article reaches several conclusions. First, it con-
cludes that all key international human rights instruments adopted
through the end of the 1960s were based in large part on the values and
concepts underlying Packer's due process model. To some extent this
outcome reflected the general academic and reformist political consen-
sus in Western democracies at the time.
The Article also shows, however, that beginning in the late 1970s the
situation began to change, with the development of the academic study
of victimology, the continuing dramatic rise of crime in most Western
societies, and shifts in political consensuses from reformist to "tough on
crime" policies, particularly in the United States and Great Britain.' 4 The
ideas and practices that emerged in this era have been variously referred
to as "penal punitivism,' ' 15 "new punitivism,' ' 16 and "new punitiveness."'7
In this study, the term "penal optimism" is also used to refer to the para-
digm underlying these developments, which is based on the assumption
that criminal sanction is effective in reducing crime, providing justice,
and protecting victims-in short, on the assumption that "prison
works."'1
de Corrientes, 5/8/2008, "La sentencia condenatoria por 'crfmenes contra la humanidad' en el
caso del Regimiento de Infanterfa Nim. 9," expediente No. 460/06 (Aug. 5, 2008) (Arg.),
available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkorlarg/doc/corrientes.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009)
(citing Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001)).
14. DAVID J. CORNWELL, DOING JUSTICE BETTER 80-81 (2007); MARKUS DIRK DuB-
BER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS 2 (2002)
(noting that the close association between the victims' rights movement and the American War
on Crime led to an "almost universal" condemnation of the movement in academic circles);
Lotc Wacquant, The Great Penal Leap Backward: Incarceration in America from Nixon to
Clinton, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 3, 15 (John Pratt et al.
eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE NEW PUNITIVENESS].
15. Jerzy Sarecki & Felipe Estrada, Keeping the Balance Between Humanism and
Penal Punitivism: Recent Trends in Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Justice in Sweden, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 473 (Josine Junger-Tas & Scott H. Decker
eds., 2006).
16. Dennis Gough, 'Tough on Probation': Probation Practice Under the National Of-
fender Management Service, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: ISSUES FOR PROBATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 91, 96, 99 (Jane Winstone & Francis J. Pakes eds., 2005).
17. Estella Baker & Julian V. Roberts, Globalization and the New Punitiveness, in THE
NEW PUNITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 121, 132; John Pratt, Sex Crimes and the New Punitive-
ness, 18 BEHAV. Sci. L. 135, 136 (2000).
18. "Prison works" is one of the most succinct and iconic statements of this attitude,
and was coined by the former British Home Secretary, Michael Howard, in his speech at the
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This trend was compounded in the 1980s, when domestic criminal
justice systems in Latin America failed to provide justice to victims of
human rights violations. The perpetrators of the crimes-many of whom
were state agents-faced impunity, and ultimately international human
rights courts had to extend support to the victims in their struggle for
justice.' 9 Some of this history is recorded in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights case law reviewed in Part III of this Article. For example,
in Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras,0 the state of Honduras failed to
investigate the disappearance of Mr. Veldsquez in 1981. The disappear-
ance was almost certainly committed by the country's military and the
Inter-American Court repeatedly urged Honduras to more vigorously
investigate. Another example is Barrios Altos v. Peru,2' in which security
officers responsible for murder were protected by amnesty laws specifi-
cally adopted to stop investigations against them. Various amnesties
preventing prosecutions were also adopted in Brazil, Argentina, and
Chile.22
As a result, a strong victims' rights and accountability jurisprudence
has been developed by both the Inter-American Court and the European
Court of Human Rights.23 The key idea behind this new jurisprudence is
that victims of human rights violations have rights to the protection of
criminal laws and to have the attacks against them vigorously and effec-
tively investigated and prosecuted. 24 The Inter-American Court also
explicitly recognizes the right of victims to have perpetrators punished
British Conservative Party conference in 1993. See Burnett Ros & Maruna Shadd, So "Prison
Works", Does It? The Criminal Careers of 130 Men Released from Prison Under Home Secre-
tary, Michael Howard, 43 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 390, 399-401 (2004).
19. As described in more detail in Part III, infra, impunity is a state of affairs in which
individuals who have committed serious human rights violations and international crimes
(often state security forces) are shielded from prosecution, either by formal legal rules, such as
one-sided amnesties, or by systemic failures of national criminal justice systems to bring them
to justice. See, e.g., THOMAS C. WRIGHT, STATE TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA 141 (2007);
Joseph R. Crowley Program/Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights: Joint 1998 Mission to Tur-
key, Special Report: Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, Police Impunity, and the
Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2129 (1999). Part
IV(C), infra, shows that in many such cases the resources of the state punitive apparatus are
aligned against victims and with criminal suspects, a situation for which Packer's due process
model fails to account.
20. Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 4 (July 29,
1988).
21. Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).
22. ANTHONY W. PEREIRA, POLITICAL (IN)JUSTICE: AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND ARGENTINA 161, 167, 171 (2005).
23. See infra Part I.
24. See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260.




or, as some authors refer to it, a "right to punishment.' 26 The European
Court, on the other hand, effectively requires member states to criminal-
ize many forms of behavior in order to protect victims from private
attacks on their life, dignity, and personal integrity.
27
Importantly, the human rights violations triggering these victims'
rights are not limited to political crimes or crimes committed by state
agents. Rather, they increasingly include criminal offenses committed by
• • •28
ordinary citizens in non-political contexts.
International documents now recognize that victims have a number
of procedural rights of participation in criminal proceedings concerning
them, such as rights to take part in hearings and to be informed of the
progress of proceedings.29 The recent recognition of victims' rights in
human rights law has reached far beyond these procedural rights, how-
ever, and appears to recognize a number of "substantive" rights of
victims as well, including the right to have offenders punished. 30 This
Article concerns itself only with the latter trend because the procedural
rights of victims are not, at least at this stage, in such direct conflict with
the established notions of due process for criminal defendants as to ques-
tion the viability of the due process model in human rights law.3,
The Article argues that the increased recognition of the substantive
rights of victims in regional human rights law sends a mixed message to
domestic criminal justice systems, which are required to implement ex-
pansive protections for victims while in theory retaining due process
26. Fernando Felipe Basch, The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Regarding States' Duty to Punish Human Rights Violations and Its Dangers, 23 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 195, 228 (2007).
27. M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIlI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124; A. v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2692; X. & Y. v. Nether-
lands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Albdn-Comejo v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171 (Nov.
22, 2007); Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 289.
29. These include rights to receive information about the progress of the proceedings
and of the disposition of their cases, to express their views and concerns, to obtain legal assis-
tance, to avoid unnecessary delay, and to have their privacy and safety protected. Declaration
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, 6,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34/Annex (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration of Basic Prin-
ciples of Justice for Victims]. See generally DOAK, supra note 11, at 115-58.
30. Basch, supra note 26, at 227-28.
31. This is not to say that such participation rights, in particular the right to participate
at the sentencing stage, may not have serious implications for the accused. See, e.g.,
James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial: Encourag-
ing Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CIuM. JusT. 1 (1995) (presenting evidence that jurors are more
likely to vote for a death sentence rather than life imprisonment when exposed to a statement
describing the impact of the murder on the victim's family). Nevertheless, given that sentenc-
ing in common law countries involves only convicted individuals, sentencing procedures do
not directly challenge the due process values developed for the benefit of the accused, as op-
posed to those developed for the protection of convicted criminals.
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guarantees for criminal defendants. At worst, this message may result in
increased overall punitiveness in criminal justice systems, as the victims'
12
rights movement in the United States demonstrates. At best, it fails to
deliver clear guidelines capable of guiding national authorities on how to
structure their criminal justice systems and determine their priorities in
the field. Ad hoc judgments that require national legal systems to con-
duct effective investigations and produce real results for particular
victims serve as inadequate guides for addressing systemic problems in
these legal systems.
Attempting to solve these doctrinal problems, this Article proposes a
"power balance" model of criminal process in international human rights
law. The merit of this model is that it prevents an extreme imbalance of
power that risks leading to violations of the basic rights of the weak. The
traditional due process model is essentially based on the same value of
balance. However, its limitation lies in the assumption that state power is
always aligned against the interests of the criminal defendant. This as-
sumption is not always correct, especially in societies which do not have
consistent rule of law. In such situations state institutions may actively or
passively align themselves with the interests of offenders against the in-
terests of victims.
33
The power balance model is more likely to prevent the abuse of the
penal power against criminal offenders by preserving traditional, interna-
tionally recognized due process guarantees 3' (the first element of the
model) and at the same time creating additional incentives for active
prosecution to counteract state alignment with the interests of the of-
fender (the second element of the model). Implementation of the second
element might, in practical terms, require greater empowerment of vic-
tims, in particular by providing them with additional procedural tools
(such as the right to challenge a decision not to prosecute or the right to
pursue civil remedies independent of the criminal prosecution) and re-
sources to employ those tools (such as legal aid), rather than limitation
of the rights of offenders. The second element may also require the crea-
tion of institutional incentives for prosecution of powerful actors, such as
32. See sources cited supra note 14.
33. DANIEL M. BRINKS, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POLICE KILLINGS IN LATIN AMER-
ICA: INEQUALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 31 (2008).
34. There is of course a great deal of variation among states in terms of the protections
they afford to criminal defendants, but some of the core guarantees recognized by all interna-
tional human rights instruments include presumption of innocence, protection against self-
incrimination, right to counsel, right to confrontation, protection against unreasonable
searches, prohibition on retrospective criminalization, and guarantee against double jeopardy
(non bis in idem). For an overview of these rights as recognized by the European Court of
Human Rights, see EMMERSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 273, 348, 382,440, 615.
[Vol. 31:157
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formation of genuinely independent investigative and prosecutorial au-
thorities.
In making this argument, Part I outlines Packer's models and those
of his successors and critics. Part H surveys the ideas and values under-
lying the criminal-justice-related provisions of key international human
rights instruments and early European human rights jurisprudence, find-
ing this law closely aligned with Packer's due process model. Part III
surveys recent jurisprudence in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, which recognize in-
creasing rights for victims in human rights cases. Part IV considers the
implications of this new, victim-oriented human rights jurisprudence,
examining the tension it produces with existing, due-process-oriented
international human rights instruments.
Part V concludes by suggesting that the due process and victims'
rights elements of the international human rights law can properly be
understood as two aspects of the power balance model: both seek to ad-
dress the same overarching concerns about appropriate balance of power
and the potential for abuse that an excessive imbalance of power tends to
produce. It is for this reason that the power balance model seeks not only
to implement procedural checks on state penal power that will protect
criminal defendants' due process rights, but also to create incentives to
exercise this power when necessary to intervene against those protected
by the state.
I. MODELS OF CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. Due Process and Crime Control Models
In his pioneering work35 Herbert Packer proposed two conceptual
models to describe the function of the criminal process: the crime con-
trol model, which emphasized repression of criminal conduct and
reduction in crime,36 and the due process model, which emphasized pro-
tection of individuals, primarily criminal defendants, from official
oppression.37
Packer argued that the shape of the criminal process is influenced by
the answers the legal system gives to a set of basic questions regarding
the purpose and values of criminal process. He sought to identify norma-
tive models that identified the basic values informing such choices."
35. Packer, supra note 9, at 5-6.
36. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 158 (1968).
37. Id. at 166.
38. Id. at 153.
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Herbert Packer saw his models as an attempt to abstract two separate
value systems that compete for attention during the criminal justice
process.39 He suggested that his due process model can be visualized as
an obstacle course and his crime control model as an assembly line in
the movement of the criminal process to its logical conclusion: imposi-
tion of criminal punishment on the accused.40
The due process model can be described as willing to impose proce-
dural restrictions on application of criminal law even if these restrictions
can limit the efficiency of this application.4 Conviction of those who are
not guilty is seen in the model as unacceptable and to be avoided, even at
the cost of slowing down the process and risking acquittal of the guilty.
42
The basic motivation underlying the due process model is a desire to
minimize mistakes in ascertaining guilt.43 The more fundamental value
behind it, however, is recognition of the primacy of the individual and
the complementary limitation on state power." It is based on the notion
that power is subject to abuse and that penal power can be abused with
particular brutality.45 To prevent such abuse the model seeks to subject
the exercise of this power to certain checks and controls which are capa-
ble of reducing the efficiency of the system. 6
The key instrument limiting such abuse of power is the concept of
legal guilt, which allows punishment of an accused only if pronounced
legally guilty.47 The pronouncement of legal guilt is only possible where
there is not only a factual finding supporting the guilt, but where this
finding is also made through proper procedures.48 For example, the con-
victing tribunal must have jurisdiction, the statute of limitations may not
have elapsed, and the accused may not have been previously convicted
or acquitted of the same offense. 49 The due process model seeks to create
"a procedural situation that permits the successful assertion of defenses
having nothing to do with factual guilt."5° It asserts that a factually guilty
person may nonetheless be legally innocent.5' In fact, the due process
approach is so averse to the possibility that an innocent person might be
39. Packer, supra note 9, at 5.
40. PACKER, supra note 36, at 163.
41. Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in Ameri-
can Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1009-11 (1974).
42. PACKER, supra note 36, at 165-67.
43. Id. at 165.
44. Packer, supra note 9, at 16.
45. PACKER, supra note 36, at 165-66.
46. Packer, supra note 9, at 16.
47. PACKER, supra note 36, at 165-66.
48. Packer, supra note 9, at 16.
49. Id. at 17.
50. PACKER, supra note 36, at 167.
51. Packer, supra note 9, at 17.
[Vol. 31:157
Prosecuting Torturers
convicted that it sacrifices fact-finding precision and is prepared to ac-
cept the possibility that a substantial number of factually guilty
defendants might be acquitted .
Finally, another underlying feature of the due process model is skep-
ticism about the morality and the utility of criminal sanction. 3 It is this
attitude toward the role of criminal law that underlies the procedural
measures favored by the model.M
By contrast, the crime control model emphasizes efficiency in the
processing of cases and in the application of criminal sanctions." In the
crime control model, Packer notes, "the failure of law enforcement to
bring criminal conduct under tight control is viewed as leading to the
breakdown of public order and thence to the disappearance of an impor-
tant condition of human freedom. ' 6 To streamline operations the crime
control model favors informal procedures, such as the ascertainment of
truth through initial, informal administrative investigation mechanisms,
including interrogation. 7 This essentially requires placing confidence in
an initial evaluation of guilt by law enforcement officials and then rely-
ing de facto on the presumption of guilt.
58
Although Packer mostly focuses on the procedural aspects of his
models, procedural and substantive dimensions of the models are not
always easy to distinguish. Packer included the full exposition of his
models in his 1968 work, which was concerned primarily with substan-
tive criminal law. 9 As one of the key features of his due process model,
Packer demonstrated skepticism about the morality and the utility of the
criminal sanction.6°
B. Models of Criminal Process and International Human Rights Law
Since Packer published his work, other models have been proposed
to supplement or develop his dualist scheme.6 ' These include the victim
52. Mirjan Damaka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 576 (1973).
53. Packer, supra note 9, at 20.
54. PACKER, supra note 36, at 170-71.
55. Id. at 158.
56. Packer, supra note 9, at 9.
57. These informal methods can be contrasted against formalized and ritualized exami-
nation and cross-examination in a court. PACKER, supra note 36, at 159; Packer, supra note 9,
at 10.
58. PACKER, supra note 36, at 160.
59. Id. at 153.
60. Packer, supra note 9, at 20.
61. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Or-
ganizational Perspective, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 407 (1973).
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participation model, 62 the punitive and non-punitive victims' rights mod-
els, 63 and the police model.' Several models have been developed to
describe choices and policies pertaining to particular aspects of criminal
procedure, such as prosecutorial discretion.65 These proposed models
reflected shifts in U.S. criminal policy, and to a certain extent that of
other Western countries, after the liberalizing reforms of the 1960s and
concomitant shifts in academic interests."6
Despite the additions to and developments of his theory and its cri-
tiques,67 Herbert Packer's work remains the starting point of any
discussion of ideology or basic principles underlying criminal process.
One expression of this continued vitality and relevance is the recurrent
criticism and effort to modify or extend his work.68
Although developed to explain the dynamics of U.S. constitutional
criminal procedure in the 1960s,69 Packer's models have acquired recog-
nition far beyond U.S. law. They have been used in studies of European
human rights norms concerning criminal procedure, national laws in
European countries, Russian criminal procedure,7' and international
human rights law. 72 And, Packer's models, more so than the work of his
62. Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participa-
tion Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1999).
63. Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
661, 700-13 (1999).
64. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Police Model of the Criminal Process, Presentation at the
Buffalo Criminal Law Center Conference: The New Police Science: Police Powers in Com-
parative Perspective (June 12-13, 2004), available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/
policemodel.PDF (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
65. JULIA FIONDA, PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND DISCRETION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
172-93 (1995).
66. LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERA-
TIONS 249 (2005) (noting that Packer originally proposed his two models in the context of the
Warren Court revolution in criminal law).
67. MacDonald, supra note 8, at 264-76.
68. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 213-14 (1983) (noting that Packer's
models lack specific procedural content and are concerned exclusively with which party, the
state or the individual, should get the advantage in their adversarial contest); Damatka, supra
note 52, at 574-77 (same).
69. Packer, supra note 9, at 2; Roach, supra note 63, at 682-84.
70. See, e.g., M. BEDRI ERYILMAZ, ARREST AND DETENTION POWERS IN ENGLISH AND
TURKISH LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 17 (1999); FIONDA, supra note 65, at 175; Ralph Henham, Human Rights, Due Proc-
ess and Sentencing, 38 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 592 (1998).
71. See, e.g., Vladimir N. Makhov & Mikhail A. Peshkov, Sostiazatelnost Modeley
Ugolovnogo Protsessa v SShA [Competition of the Models of Criminal Process of the USA],
12Gos. IPRAVO8l (1999).
72. Farkhanda Zia Mansoor, Reassessing Packer in the Light of International Human
Rights Norms, 4 CONN. PUB. INT'L L.J. 262 (2005).
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successors and critics, are well-suited to the analysis of international
human rights law.73
In this Article, Packer's models are applied to both the procedural
and substantive aspects of human rights jurisprudence. This approach is
justified by Packer's own treatment of his models. The main thrust of the
models is normative rather than descriptive,4 and it is in this light that
they are used to analyze international human rights norms. This ap-
proach is all the more productive in the context of international law,
given the fact that international human rights norms in most cases do not
immediately direct the actions of domestic criminal justice actors. Ra-
ther, they usually serve as "norms for norms," attempting to shape
legislative provisions and practices in domestic law, which in turn di-
rectly govern the behavior of actors in state criminal justice systems.
In a sense, international human rights norms themselves serve as
models with functions not dissimilar to those identified by Packer. They
govern (or are at least supposed to govern) the decisionmaking and value
choices that national authorities make in structuring their criminal pro-
cedure. Like Packer's models, international human rights norms do not
necessarily prescribe decisions for every difficult issue that domestic
legal systems confront. Rather, they provide minimum standards and, in
some cases, general guidance on how to proceed beyond such standards
toward more detailed norms. This can be seen as one of the expressions
of the principle of subsidiarity which guides international human rights
law.75
I. THE TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS MODEL IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Due Process Rights in the Main International
Human Rights Instruments and Their Origins
This Part shows that since the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, key human rights instruments have reflected the same
73. The models proposed by other authors seem not to be as well-suited for the pur-
poses of human rights law. For instance, Griffiths' family model cannot be the basis for
thoughts about criminal justice in the human rights context due to the necessarily legalistic
nature of states' human rights obligations. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a
Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970). The same can be said for
the non-punitive victims' rights model. Due to these models' focus on informality and extra-
legal procedures, they have not yet received recognition in binding international human rights
instruments or in the jurisprudence of human rights tribunals. Roach, supra note 63.
74. Paul Roberts, Comparative Criminal Justice Goes Global, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 369, 377-79 (2008).
75. Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 79 (2003).
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values as those underlying the due process model. For example, early
international human rights law and theory imposed limits on what states
could do to their own nationals." For a long time human rights advocates
focused their efforts on promoting this negative understanding of what
human rights meant in the field of criminal justice.7
Nearly all basic international human rights instruments recognize a
number of rights that have implications for criminal procedure. Some
provisions specify that they apply only to the criminally accused while
others are formulated in general terms but, based on their contents would
appear to apply primarily to the accused.78
It has been noted that the drafters of the major international human
rights instruments assumed that only those accused of an offense were
76. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (2002) (noting that during the discus-
sion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of its key drafters, Rend Cassin,
argued that the danger of the age, which human rights protections were to address, was not
that the state was not strong enough but that it was too strong); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION 602 (2001) (describing how the idea of rights as guarantees against one's own
government grew out of the experience of German occupation in continental Europe); Louis
B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
77. Compare ELIZABETH KEANE, AN IRISH STATESMAN AND REVOLUTIONARY: THE
NATIONALIST AND INTERNATIONALIST POLITICS OF SEkN MACBRIDE 182-85 (2006) (describ-
ing the early human rights movement and Amnesty International's concern about politically
motivated prosecution and the abuse of political prisoners in the 1960s) with Jared Wessel,
Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyz-
ing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 446-47 (2006) (describing
how participants in the negotiations of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in the
1990s, which included dozens of human rights advocacy organizations, represented the inter-
ests of victims but none represented the interests of the potential accused). To be sure, this
"negative" notion of rights was contested from the outset in the field of so-called social and
economic rights, which explicitly imposed positive demands on states. See generally GLEN-
DON, supra note 76, at 58, 185-86 (describing the debates between Western and Soviet
representatives about political and civil rights and economic and social rights before the adop-
tion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The
Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 158-59 (1987).
78. Articles 9 through 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights deal either
explicitly or implicitly with various limitations on substantive criminal law and criminal pro-
cedure: from prohibition of arbitrary arrest to protection of private correspondence. All of
them potentially limit the powers of law-enforcement agencies. Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 9-12, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although
making a number of concessions to the crime control model, is clearly based on the concept of
primacy of due process rights among other objectives of the criminal process. The Convention
either explicitly provides for the rights of criminal defendants or establishes basic principles of
criminal procedure protecting criminal defendants. See International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights arts. 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) (providing substantive and procedural criminal law guarantees).
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entitled to protection during a criminal proceeding. 9 Even those authors
who see this situation as "antiquated" acknowledge that there is "no way
round [sic] the fact" that the rights of defense enshrined in international
human right instruments do not apply to the victim.' For example, al-
though the fair trial guarantee under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights protects both parties, in criminal cases
those protections are reserved exclusively for the accused."
Although, recent interpretations of the European Convention and the
American Convention on Human Rights82 have read certain rights into
these instruments for victims, 3 in fact the text of neither convention in-
cludes any reference to such rights. Both instruments follow the
Universal Declaration and the International Covenant in recognizing, at
least explicitly, only the rights of criminal defendants.8 ' The same applies
to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man" and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.86 Perhaps the first inter-
national instrument dedicated explicitly to victims' rights in the criminal
justice process was the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Vic-
tims of Crime and Abuse of Power.87
Many international instruments explicitly term some of the rights of
criminal defendants as "due process rights.'8 8 The European Convention
on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights have
been consistently interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights89
79. STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 36 (2005) (discuss-
ing the European Convention of Human Rights).
80. Id. at 38. Although said in the context of the European Convention, this statement
rather adequately describes the ideology underlying other major international human rights
instruments as well.
81. Id. at 36.
82. American Convention on Human Rights art. 46, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. I at 27 (2003).
83. For a description of these interpretations, see infra Part M.
84. See id.
85. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XXVI, Apr. 1948,
O.A.S. Res. XXX [hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PER-
TAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6
rev. l, at 17 (1992) (referring to the "right to due process of law").
86. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (guaranteeing the right to have one's case heard).
87. U.N. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims, supra note 29; see also
infra Part III.
88. See American Declaration, supra note 85, art. XXVI. Article 46 of the American
Convention also mentions due process of law in the context of admissibility. It relaxes the rule
requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies where it is found that domestic legislation does not
afford due process of law. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82, art. 46.
89. Czekalla v. Portugal, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 43, 71; Osman v. United Kingdom,
1998-VIII Fur. Ct. H.R. 3124,1 116.
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and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights9 respectively as guaran-
teeing "due process" principles.
Therefore, although none of the human rights instruments or human
rights cases mention Packer or his models by name, it would be fair to
describe the international human rights law concerning criminal proce-
dure as based on the due process model.9 ' To be sure, the due process
model inherent in international human rights instruments has always
been aspirational rather than achieved in practice.92 However, this does
not make due process substantially different from most other human
rights norms. Compliance with human rights law is a matter of perennial
concern in human rights practice as well as in academia.9 3 The gap be-
tween principle and reality also brings the human rights due process
model closer to Packer's models, who also recognizes that they provide
normative value systems rather than a description of existing social con-
dition.
In addition to its focus on the rights of the accused, the traditional
due process model had two other important components: (1) a preference
for adversarial procedures and procedures in general as a way of protect-
ing the rights of individuals and (2) a focus on limiting, rather than
enhancing, state power. These two aspects are intimately connected since
90. Gutirrrez-Soler v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 132, 1 98 (Sept.
12, 2005). Mr. Gutirrez-Soler was accused of being involved in a kidnapping. He was appre-
hended by the police anti-extortion unit and, while in custody, was allegedly tortured for his
confession by a police officer and his accuser. The Court found a violation of the American
Convention and in doing so referred to its procedural guarantees as protecting the "due proc-
ess of law." Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94, 148
(June 21, 2002); see also Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, 160
(Sept. 7, 2004). In its 1999 Advisory Opinion discussing the rights of arrested foreign nation-
als to be informed about their entitlement to consular assistance, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights explicitly referred to the procedural guarantees established by the American
Convention as "due process of law," remarking that the due process of law, "with all its rights
and guarantees, must be respected regardless of the circumstances." The Right to Information
on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, 1999
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, 135 (Oct. 1, 1999) (Advisory Opinion OC-16/99).
91. Mansoor, supra note 72, at 265-66.
92. In this respect they may not be different from constitutional due process guarantees
in most countries, including countries with established rule of law. John Boli, Human Rights
or State Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of Constitutional Rights, 1870-1970, in IN-
STITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL 21, 72-73
(George Thomas et al. eds., 1987); Goldstein, supra note 41, at 1009-11.
93. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 3 (1998); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
621, 627, 644, 647 (2004); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Treaties Make a Difference? Human Rights
Treaties and the Problem of Compliance, I 1l YALE L.J. 1932, 1938 (2002); Eica B. Schlager,
A Hard Look at Compliance with 'Soft' Law: The Case of the OSCE, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
346 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2003).
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both envision a "reactive," limited state that passively resolves private
disputes, rather than an activist state that proactively manages social
problems. 4
The reasons for this vision are historical and lie at the root of the
concepts of criminal justice and human rights, as perceived in the middle
of the 20" century when the core international human rights instruments
were negotiated. In most modern states crime is conceived first and
foremost as a violation of the law's command. A procedural conse-
quence of such an approach is that states take the primary responsibility
for prosecuting criminals, while victims serve primarily as sources of
information.95 Accordingly, up until the 1980s, criminal justice thinking
in the West was dominated by the idea that the criminal justice process is
a process of confrontation between the criminal and the state. It is still
seen this way in practice, despite serious efforts to bring victims into the
96process.
Since the state is seen as infinitely more powerful than any one indi-
vidual, the focus on limiting the power of the state to protect the
individual in this confrontation appears natural. After all, the entire en-
terprise of human rights law was initially concerned to a large extent
with limiting what nation-states can do to their own nationals.97 Nowhere
is this attitude to rights as limits on state power as clear as in criminal
law, which is the most potent tool of coercion the modern nation-state
wields. All natural rights traditions-from earlier religious natural law
theories9" to the works of French Enlightenment thinkers99-stressed the
importance of limitations on state power as a threat to natural rights.
94. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COM-
PARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 73-82 (1986); Roach, supra note 63, at 692.
95. HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE (1990)
(expressing a view of criminal procedure that is common across the common law-civil law
divide, although civil law jurisdictions tend to allow victims to participate in criminal proceed-
ings more actively).
96. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECU-
TOR 61 (2007).
97. GLENDON, supra note 76, at 60 (discussing the insistence of Ren6 Cassin, one of
the key drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that this document should
provide a way to limit the excesses of unbounded state sovereignty in domestic affairs, a con-
cept which had prevented the international community from stopping the development of
Nazism). See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(Archon Books 1968) (1950).
98. Mark W. Janis, Religion and International Law: Some Basic Texts, in RELIGION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 2004) (discussing Hugo
Grotius' notion that higher, divinely ordained natural law limits sovereign rules). See generally
Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin American Tradition of
the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 28 (2003); Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment:
Natural Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 952
(1961).
99. SIMPSON, supra note 76 at 21.
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According to the classical formulation by Max Weber, the state has a
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.'0 Even in the early modem
times kings viewed legitimate force, expressed most fully in the power to
punish criminality, as their private tool of oppression and of problem
solving.'0 ' This outraged and frightened those who laid the groundwork
of the modem concept of rights as limits on state power. Among them
were the authors of the U.S. Constitution, who viewed abuse of criminal
law as the epitome of all things tyrannical in the rule of the British
king. 102
However, the need to limit the arbitrary use of state penal power by
imposing procedural limits on its use is only one reason for the due
process emphasis of human rights law. Another reason is the need to cor-
rect the natural imbalance of power in the criminal justice system. This
imbalance is caused not only by the fact that the state is more powerful
than any single individual confronting it but also by the fact that in the
criminal justice field, an accused individual may not have adequate po-
litical protections. Criminal suspects are often marginalized and perhaps
the most politically vulnerable constituency, even in strong democracies.
While victims of crime are capable of exerting political pressure, at least
in democratic regimes, criminals or even suspected criminals cannot al-
ways work through the political process to protect their rights. They need
not be formally disenfranchised, as they are in many U.S. states,' 3 to be
an unpopular group for any politician to defend. In this sense, criminals
arguably are a "distinct and insular minority"' 4 underrepresented in the
political process. Some criminals, notably terrorists, provide an extreme
100. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77,
78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., Routledge 2001) (1919).
101. Note that this use of criminal power to solve personal problems of politicians is not
a purely historical phenomenon. It is still widespread in most developing countries and even
highly developed Western democracies know examples of such abuse of penal power. For
some of the numerous examples through ages and continents, see LILIA F. SHEVTSOVA, PU-
TIN'S RUSSIA 275-94 (Antonina W. Bouis trans., 2005) (discussing the prosecution of Russian
tycoon Dmitri Khodorkovsky for threatening the regime of President Vladimir Putin); RICH-
ARD D. WHITE, JR., KINGFISH: THE REIGN OF HUEY P. LONG 111-12 (2006) (recounting
examples of the use of state police by former Louisiana Governor Huey Long to fight his
political opponents in the 1930s); Larry Catd Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in
the United States, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 37-46 (2005) (dis-
cussing politically motivated conviction of the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
Anwar Ibrahim for sodomy).
102. Gene Healy, Introduction to Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: CRIMINALIZATiON OF ALMOST
EVERYTHING, at vii, vii (Gene Healy ed., 2004).
103. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777, 781 (2002)
(noting that at that time forty-eight out of fifty U.S. states disenfranchised convicted felons, in
most cases even those on probation and parole).
104. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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example of this political exclusion. At this extreme level, criminals are
seen as enemies to be defeated and even exterminated. They are seen as
such a threat to the established order that they are deprived of the basic
protections of that order.05
Enforcement of constitutionally or internationally guaranteed rights
by politically unaccountable tribunals (domestic or international) is often
the most effective way to protect the basic interests of such politically
disadvantaged and excluded groups.' 6 Criminal suspects are a very suit-
able group for such protection.0 7 On the other hand, human rights
regimes are often better equipped to provide such independent, politi-
cally neutral review of domestic practices and to extend protection to
politically excluded criminal suspects because human rights regimes are
sometimes designed to play an anti-majoritarian role.'08
105. Since 1980 the concepts of "citizen criminal law" and "enemy criminal law," pro-
posed originally by Giinther Jakobs, have gained currency in German and later Spanish and
Latin American criminal law theory. Gointer Jakobs, Biirgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht, in
FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41 (Yuhsiu Hsu ed.,
2003), available at http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/archiv/04-03/index.php3?seite=6 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2007). Essentially this concept also posits the existence of two models of
criminal law and, to a lesser extent, criminal process. One, devised for "citizens" is character-
ized by all the hallmarks of traditional criminal law, such as presumption of innocence. Carlos
G6mez-Jara Dfez, Enemy Combatants Versus Enemy Criminal Law: An Introduction to the
European Debate Regarding Enemy Criminal Law and Its Relevance to the Anglo-American
Discussion on the Legal Status of Unlawful Enemy Combatants, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 529,
559 (2008). The category of "citizens" does not denote nationality but rather refers to common
criminals, who pursue various criminal ends but stop short of aiming to destroy the democratic
political order. The "Enemies Criminal Law," on the other hand, is not a vehicle of punishment
in the traditional sense but rather is a tool in the war waged by the polity against those who
seek to destroy it, and who do not recognize the minimal authority of the punishing state. Id.
at 541-43. An obvious example of application of an enemy criminal law is the security meas-
ures used against "unlawful enemy combatants" in the United States. Id. at 530-32. However,
some authors have suggested that the paradigm of the "criminal as an enemy" has come to
dominate general criminal law in the United States. See, e.g., Markus D. Dubber, Guerra y
paz: Derecho penal del enemigo y el modelo de potestad de supervisi6n policial del Derecho
penal estadounidense, in I DERECHO PENAL DEL ENEMIGO: EL DISCURSO PENAL DE LA Ex-
CLusI6N 684 (Cancio Melii & G6mez-Jara Diez eds., 2006).
106. Javier A. Couso, The Impact of the Warren Court in Latin America, in EARL WAR-
REN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 239 (Harry N.
Scheiber ed., 2007) (discussing the willingness of the Warren court in the United States to
provide due process guarantees to protect criminal defendants, as one of such marginalized
groups).
107. Franklin E. Zimring, The Weakest Link: Human Rights and the Criminal Offender
in Modern Democratic Government. in PUNISHMENT, PLACES AND PERPETRATORS: DEVELOP-
MENTS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 106, 107 (Gerben Bruinsma et al.
eds., 2004) (stating that "the serious criminal offender-the rapist and the robber-is the least
attractive case for claims to limit government power, but he or she is, for that reason, the most
important frontier for defending the limits on that power" because "the claim of human rights
against government power is only as strong as its weakest link").
108. In many cases, international human rights institutions have been envisaged as a
means to prevent participating states from sliding into the worst forms of authoritarianism,
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In effect, the traditional human rights approach to criminal justice
assumes that a modem state wields an enormous penal power which,
when used, is prone to abuse. Assuming enormous imbalance of power
between a criminal defendant and the state law enforcement apparatus, it
seeks to protect individuals from abuse of such power through proce-
dural checks.
However, this approach fails to take account of the fact that wide-
spread failure to exercise penal power may also constitute abuse-an
oversight that is the most significant limitation of the traditional due
process model in international human rights law. While the model envis-
ages the possibility of abuse through the use of penal power, it fails to
address that the state's failure to restrain private or public-private vio-
lence may actually facilitate such violence. As Professor Daniel Brinks
has shown in his analysis of police violence in Latin America, many
criminal justice systems are resistant to claims brought by representa-
tives of marginalized groups, especially if the alleged perpetrator
belongs to a higher social class or is a state official.' °9
B. The Traditional Due Process Approach and Its
Implications for Victims
The due process model, which focuses exclusively on protecting the
rights of the accused, involves certain tradeoffs-which often fall most
even when domestic political factors favor such a result. Andrew Moravcsik argues that the
European human rights system owes its existence to the desire of post-World War II, newly
democratic European states to avoid sliding back to authoritarianism as a result of abuse of
domestic democratic politics. In this sense, the European human rights mechanism was de-
vised from the beginning as a counter-majoritarian mechanism of quasi-constitutional review.
Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post-
war Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000). Moravcsik considered his findings relevant not only
for Europe but for international human rights regimes in general. However, other human rights
protection systems can also be seen as having a strong anti-majoritarian element characteristic
of domestic judicial review systems. For example, in the early 1990s the Inter-American
Commission reviewed petitions from Uruguay concerning amnesty laws adopted by the new
democratic governments and barring prosecution of those involved in human rights abuses of
the previous governments, even though the Uruguayan amnesty had been approved by na-
tional referendum. See Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372,
10.373, 10.374 & 10.375 (Uruguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/92, It 2-7 (1992).
Nevertheless, majoritarian support did not persuade the Commission of the amnesty's legality,
and the Commission agreed that domestic legality and legitimacy of the measures did not
necessarily mean they complied with international law. Id. 31 (1993).
109. See BRINKS, supra note 33, at 117. Some authors see this resistance in class terms
as a method of maintaining the exclusive access of certain classes to the benefits which are in
theory supposed to be enjoyed by all. Mindie Lazarus-Black & Patricia L. McCall, A Look at
the Numbers, in MINDIE LAZARUS-BLACK, EVERYDAY HARM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, COURT
RITES, AND CULTURES OF RECONCILIATION 35, 36 (2007).
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heavily on the victims. The European case of Barbera v. Spain"° pro-
vides an example.
In Barbera, a group of Catalan separatists killed a prominent busi-
nessman while trying to extract a ransom from him. Several suspects were
apprehended and convicted based on fairly strong evidence, including
their own confessions."' However, the European Court eventually ruled
that their right to a fair trial had been violated by the Spanish authorities.
The Court cited a number of procedural irregularities, including "the un-
expected change in the court's membership immediately before the
hearing opened, the brevity of the trial and, above all, the fact that very
important pieces of evidence were not adequately adduced and discussed
at the trial in the applicants' presence and under the watchful eye of the
public."' Following this judgment, the applicants were acquitted by na-
tional courts and served only small portions of their sentences."3
The European Court applied the traditional due process approach to
this case: it sided with the unpopular defendants, protecting them from
state institutions, which, given the prominence of the case, were perhaps
overly eager to convict and punish them. The Court did so by requiring
the state to adhere strictly to the procedures designed to make the trial
fair. Characteristically, neither the applicants' factual guilt nor the con-
cerns of the victims were given significant attention by the Court.' 
The case illustrates that the tension between the due process model
and the rights of victims lies not in the conflict between the specific
rights of the accused and those of the victims. Rather, it stems from the
fact that the concept of legal guilt-central to the due process model-
can operate effectively only if courts exclude from their deliberation the
effect on victims, as the European Court did in Barberai.
Until the 1990s European human rights institutions concluded that the
need to protect the rights of the accused made it impossible for them also
to recognize substantive 5 victims' rights under human rights norms. Al-
though the Inter-American system has never had the opportunity to rule
110. Barber5 v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7 (1989).
111. ld. 114, 16-19.
112. Id. [89.
113. After being sentenced in 1982 to thirty years for murder, Mr. BarberA and Mr.
Messegud served their sentences under the open prison regime. Id. In 8, 29. Mr. Jabardo, hav-
ing been sentenced to six years for assisting armed gangs, had been released by the time the
European Court decided the case. id. 31. Following the judgment, the Spanish Constitutional
Court quashed the applicants' convictions and released them. Barberh v. Spain, 285 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 51, 5 (1994).
114. The Court mentions only in passing the efforts of the victim's son to extend the
sentence of the murder's mastermind of the murder. Barberii, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7, 18.
115. For example, a substantive right might include a right to have the perpetrator of a
crime found and punished, whereas a procedural rights might entail a right to be informed of
the key procedural decisions or to participate in proceedings.
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on the subject, European human rights institutions have consistently held
that the victim of a crime has no right to have the perpetrator criminally
punished. In Perez v. France, the European Court explained this ap-
proach by noting that the European Convention did not protect a right to
"private revenge."' 16
Although many human rights tribunals continue to protect the due
process rights of unpopular defendants, especially in terrorism-related
cases,17 recent international human rights law has developed a range of
substantive rights for victims and corresponding positive obligations for
states. These developments may lead one to question whether the due
process model, which relies on marginalization of victims' concerns, still
remains a valid tool for analyzing the current state of international hu-
man rights law.
III. THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS REVOLUTION AND THE NEW PUNITIVENESS
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Victims and the New Punitiveness in Domestic Politics
and International Law
Recent developments in the international law of victims' rights and
accountability for gross human rights violations cannot be fully under-
stood without placing them in the context of domestic legal theory and
practice-a context marked by greater attention to the interests of the
victim.
Persistently growing crime rates and widely spreading victimization
in developed nations in the post-World War II period triggered an aca-
demic interest in victimology, ' '8 a discipline dedicated to the study of
victims (in particular victims of crime) and victimization."9 In the United
States and the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, the dominant para-
digm shifted, moving from an emphasis on protecting defendants' civil
116. Perez v. France, 2004-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 93, 70. For commentary on Perez, see
TRECHSEL, supra note 79, at 36-38. The language used in Perez is strikingly similar to that of
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), the leading U.S. Supreme Court case on point.
In Linda R.S., which is still good law in the United States, a mother claimed that the failure of
the state of Texas to criminally punish the father of her child for failure to pay child support
violated her constitutional rights. The Court found that she lacked standing because the rem-
edy she sought, criminal punishment, was purely public in nature. Id. at 619.
117. Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 254; Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, 1999 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52 (May 30, 1999).
118. See, e.g., Jock Young, The Rising Demand for Law and Order and our Maginot
Lines of Defense Against Crime, in SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 95-111
(Nicholas Abercrombie & Alan Warde eds., 1996).
119. See, e.g., ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VIcTIMs: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY
3 (2d ed. 1990).
[Vol. 31:157
Prosecuting Torturers
rights and humanizing punishment to an emphasis on tough measures
intended to control crime.'
20
This shift did not stay within academia or right-wing politics, but
quickly gained currency and broader acceptance. The victims' rights
movement played an important role in advancing this acceptance. The
-121
language of rights is very powerful in the American political discourse.
Members of the victims' rights movement, as well as politicians who
associated themselves with the movement, were able to employ this
powerful language to advance increasingly punitive criminal justice
policies. 22 Although many due-process-oriented procedural guarantees
for criminal defendants 23 were not overturned,' 2 their existence did not
prevent the development of a much more repressive substantive criminal
law.'2
This dominance of the language of victims' rights coincided with
shifts in the ideology of the left. Criminal law has traditionally been
120. ANDREW RUTHERFORD, TRANSFORMING CRIMINAL POLICY 14 (1996); Wacquant,
supra note 14; Baker & Roberts, supra note 17.
121. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIs-
COURSE 3-7 (1993).
122. In the United States the publication of the Final Report of the President's Task
Force on Victims of Crime in 1982 can be taken as a turning moment marking the develop-
ment of a much more punitive consensus in the criminal justice field. See KATHERINE
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 14,
26, 38-43, 55-61 (1997); DUBBER, supra note 14; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CON-
TROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11-12 (2001); PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2009);
Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitution: Moving from Guaranteeing Partici-
patory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1053 (1998); Peggy M.
Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
21 (1999) (analyzing the effects of expanding victims' rights and the Report of the President's
Task Force on increasing the repressiveness of the criminal justice system in the United
States); see also PAUL ROCK, CONSTRUCTING VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE HOME OFFICE, NEW
LABOUR, AND VICTIMS (2004) (discussing similar dynamics in Great Britain).
123. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (guarantee against self-incrimination);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (protection from unwarranted searches). Craig M. Bradley, The Fourth Amendment: Be
Reasonable, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 81 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006); Yale Kamisar,
Dickerson v. United States: The Case that Disappointed Miranda's Critics-And Then Its Sup-
porters, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 106 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
124. However, the reach of some of these protections are being gradually limited. See,
e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (holding that evidence obtained while
executing an erroneously issued search warrant need not be excluded, as previously would
have been required under the exclusionary rule).
125. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End
of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (2002); William J. Stuntz, Criminal Law's
Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REv. 828 (2002); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006).
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viewed by left-leaning theorists as designed to reinforce the existing
power structure of capitalist society.2 6 Therefore it has been viewed with
suspicion as protecting the ruling classes and entrenching the unfair so-
cioeconomic order. However, beginning in the late 1970s and early
1980s, many groups on the left that had traditionally supported restraint
in the use of criminal punishment warmed up to the possibility that
criminal law could be used as a tool of social reform to shift traditional
balances of power and to protect the socially weak. Examples of and the
reasons for this shift have been documented elsewhere.' 27 Here it suffices
to review briefly some of the main domestic political and ideological
forces shaping this shift.
Many feminist scholars and activists see criminal law as a tool for
empowering women and changing their subordinated position.' 2 1 While
Packer, a liberal, was concerned with decriminalization, 9 today's liber-
als often advocate criminalization.'3" The idea that the weak have to be
126. RICHARD QUINNEY, CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER: CRIME CONTROL IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY 93 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1974).
127. See, e.g., Barry Goldson, New Punitiveness: The Politics of Child Incarceration, in
YOUTH JUSTICE: CRITICAL READINGS 386 (John Muncie et al. eds., 2002); Pat O'Malley, Vola-
tile and Contradictory Punishment, 3 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1999); Jonathan
Simon, "Entitlement to Cruelty": The End of Welfare and the Punitive Mentality in the United
States, in CRIME, RISK AND JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL IN LIBERAL DEMOC-
RACIES 125 (Kevin Stenson & Robert R. Sullivan eds., 2001).
128. See, e.g., Rebecca Adams, Violence Against Women and International Law: The
Fundamental Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence, 20 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 57
(2007); Anthony P. Ewing, Establishing State Responsibility for Private Acts of Violence
Against Women Under the American Convention on Human Rights, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 751 (1995); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237 (2005);
Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in
International Human Rights Law, 6 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993); Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Criminal Law: Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959 (2004); Symposium, Battered Women
and Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 330-31 (2002) (com-
ments by Sally Merry); Tulin D. Acikalin, Comment, Debunking the Dichotomy of
Nonintervention: The Role of the State in Regulating Domestic Violence, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1045
(2000); Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and
Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 269 (2007) (describing the international
trend to urge criminalization of marital rape).
129. PACKER, supra note 36, at 301-04.
130. This thinking about criminal law as a tool of reform is evident in calls for criminali-
zation of a number of activities viewed as particularly pernicious. Among such ills are virtual
child pornography, transborder transportation for prostitution, and pollution of the environ-
ment. See, e.g., TOM OBOKATA, TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN BEINGS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE: TOWARDS A HOLISTIC APPROACH 148-52 (2006); LAURA WESTRA, ECOVIO-
LENCE AND THE LAW: SUPRANATIONAL NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF ECOCRIME 191 (2004);
Matthew K. Wegner, Note, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why Traditional Free Speech Doc-
trine Supports Anti-Child-Pornography Regulations in Virtual Reality, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2081
(2001) (arguing for the constitutionality of the federal statute, the Child Pornography Preven-
tion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006), which criminalized as "child pornography" images
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protected has long been important to the political left and criminal law
came to be seen as one ways to do so.'3'
The new attitude toward crime control and punishment that these
domestic developments helped to bring about is characterized by the ac-
tive use of incarceration, skepticism about the possibility of
rehabilitating offenders, generally increased punitiveness of sanctions,
rising prison populations, 2 the increased public profile of victims and
their victimization, and politicization of crime control. 13  These policies
are most prevalent in the United States' 34 but as the above analysis
shows, since the 1990s they also exist in some Western European coun-
tries.'35
These developments gradually began to influence the way interna-
tional human rights law conceived of the rights of victims. Three factors
particularly facilitated this exchange of ideas between domestic politics
and international thinking in this area: (1) the adoption of the U.N. Dec-
laration on the Principles of Justice for Victims, 3 6 (2) the challenges of
transitional justice in the newly democratic Latin American counties,' 37
"[conveying] the impression" that they depict children pornographically-i.e., including com-
puter-generated images of virtual children).
131. NILS CHRISTIE, A SUITABLE AMOUNT OF CRIME 38 (2004) (discussing this trajec-
tory in the evolution of the drug control policy of the Swedish Social Democrats, who were
initially suspicious about harsh punishment and preferred social reform measures as a way of
controlling crime but later in the 1980s embraced increasingly punitive anti-drug policy, fram-
ing it as protecting the weak from exploitation by the illegal drug industry).
132. See Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United
States, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4 (David Garland ed.,
2001).
133. GARLAND, supra note 122, at 8-9, 11-13. Throughout this Article, this set of ideas
is referred in its theoretical form as "new punitiveness." See examples of this usage in Baker
& Roberts, supra note 17, at 121, 132.
134. NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARDS GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE
35 (3d ed. 2000).
135. Ian Brownlee, New Labour-New Penology-Punitive Rhetoric and the Limits of Ma-
nagerialism in Criminal Justice Policy, 25 J.L. & Soc'y 313, 314-15 (1998) (discussing
changes in the policies of the British Labor Party, which since the 1997 elections has stressed
increasingly tough-on-crime policies); Ian Loader, Fall of the 'Platonic Guardians' Liberal-
ism, Criminology and Political Responses to Crime in England and Wales, 46 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 561, 563--64. 570-79 (2006) (describing the attitude to crime problems as best
dealt with by experts rather than politicians, an attitude which prevailed in Britain for most of
the twentieth century and disintegrated under pressure from electoral politics); CHRISTIE,
supra note 131, at 38 (discussing increasingly punitive anti-drug policies in Sweden).
136. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
G.A. Res. 40/34, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 96th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Declaration for Victims].
137. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 53 (2000).
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and (3) general development of the concept of positive obligations of
states in international human rights law.'
38
The United Nations Declaration on the Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power was adopted by the General
Assembly in 1985."9 Although it was careful to proclaim the impor-
tance of non-punitive measures of support (for example compensation
and social services) for victims rather than their right to punishment, 40
it had the effect of drawing attention to the issue of victims' rights in-
ternationally. 141
International human rights advocates, influenced in part by shifts in
domestic ideology,' 42 were confronted in the late 1980s and early 1990s
by the problem facing countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Cen-
tral Europe that were transitioning from authoritarian and totalitarian
regimes to democracy. The question confronting new governments from
Argentina to Rwanda was how to deal with the atrocities and systematic
crimes committed by previous regimes, a field now known as "transi-
tional justice.' 4' Human rights activists saw a need to hold individuals
who had committed serious human rights violations accountable as a
way of restoring confidence in the rule of law and preventing violations
from occurring again. Unfortunately, accountability rarely materialized,
with the guilty avoiding liability for even the worst crimes. International
law was enlisted to help young democratic regimes (or at least less op-
pressive regimes) to deal with the pervasive problem that came to be
known as "impunity."'"
138. ALASTAIR R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (2004).
139. Declaration for Victims, supra note 136.
140. Roach, supra note 63, at 708-10.
141. Sandro Calvani, Dir., U.N. Interregional Crime & Just. Res. Inst., Remarks at EU
for Victims of Crime 2009-Launch of the Manifesto for Europe, Brussels, BeIg. (Feb. 20,
2008), available at http://www.unicri.it/wwa/staff/speeches/080220-dir.pdf (last visited Oct.
4, 2009).
142. These shifts in domestic ideology, particularly on the left, are significant given that
the general intellectual disposition of the people shaping international human rights law today
tends to be left-wing humanitarian internationalism. Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at
the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudica-
tion, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377,444-49 (2006).
143. TEITEL, supra note 137, at 1-3.
144. See, e.g., YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PRO-
GRESS AND NEW CHALLENGES (2005); IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND PRACTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537
(1990); Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in
Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 661 (2004).
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The term "impunity," developed in Latin America but now used
around the world, refers to the lack of legal consequences for grave
crimes and human rights violations. 45 Impunity can be perpetuated de
facto or de jure' 46 and in the latter case it can be the result of unfairly
granted amnesties and pardons. 47 Although identification of the problem
as one of "impunity" focuses attention on the lack of criminal punish-
ment, this lack of punishment is usually compounded by failures to grant
compensation, identify those responsible, and ascertain the exact facts of
the violations, or by a denial that a violation has been committed.
The third major factor shaping the new attitude of international hu-
man rights law to criminal law and punishment was the development of
the idea that states have positive human rights obligations.' 48 The concept
of positive obligations is particularly important in the field of economic
and social rights 49 and was first widely recognized with the adoption of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
50
However, it has not been limited to social and economic rights and, as
the following analysis shows, had profound implications for criminal-
justice-related human rights law."'
145. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 409 (2000); Paz Rojas Baeza, Impunity: An Impossible Reparation, 69 NORDIC
J. INT'L L. 27 (2000) (noting that military regimes in Chile and Argentina were especially
prominent, but others, including in Central America, were perhaps no less gruesome); Naomi
Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: Responding to War Crimes of Sexual Violence, 1
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217 (2005).
146. This distinction is recognized in a definition of impunity proposed by Diane Or-
entlicher:
"Impunity" means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators
of violations to account-whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary
proceedings since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being
accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and
to making reparations to their victims.
The Independent Expert, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to
Combat Impunity, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, at 6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add. 1 (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Impunity Guidelines]. The Impunity
Guidelines were noted by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights as "a guideline to assist
States in developing effective measures for combating impunity." Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 2005/81, 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/81 (Apr. 21, 2005).
147. For an amnesty granted in Peru, see Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 75, 2(i), (k), (in) (Mar. 14, 2001).
148. See, e.g., MOWBRAY, supra note 138.
149. See, e.g., SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS
AND POSITIVE DUTIES 204 (2008).
150. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
151. The issue of positive obligations is also important in many other areas of interna-
tional law, including for example in the business and human rights field, where states are said
to have positive duties to protect their residents from violations of their rights by private ac-
tors. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
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Today, the increased recognition of victims' rights and the princi-
ples of accountability for gross human rights violations in international
law is not limited to regional human rights tribunals.' It is also evident
in international criminal law,'53 transitional justice,'4 and a number of
non-binding regional instruments.'55 However, this Article focuses pri-
marily on the regional human rights law in Europe and the Americas
since regional human rights law often has the most immediate impacts
on domestic legal systems in these regions, where such law is often
directly enforceable as quasi-constitutional or even supra-constitutional
law by domestic courts.'
56
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
152. See generally Michael Bachrach, The Protection and Rights of Victims Under Inter-
national Criminal Law, 34 INT'L L. 7, 10 (2000) (noting that "many steps, however limited,
have been taken toward advancing victims' rights under international criminal law").
153. Most notably, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains a
number of provisions explicitly aimed at protecting the rights of victims. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court arts. 15(3), 19(3), 43(6), 53(1)(c), 57(3)(c), 64(2), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
154. A number of non-binding international documents provide authoritative summaries
of developments in international law and practice in the field. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study Concern-
ing the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993)
(submitted by Theo Van Boven); Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Inter-
national Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
ECOSOC Res. 2005/30, U.N. Doc. EIRES/2005/30 (July 25, 2005) [hereinafter Remedy
Guidelines]; Impunity Guidelines, supra note 146.
155. Council of Eur. [CoE], COMM. OF MINISTERS, The Role of Public Prosecution in the
Criminal Justice System, TT 33, 34, 724th Mtg. Ministers' Deputies, Doc. No. Rec(2000)19E
(Oct. 6, 2000) available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jspid=376859&Site=CM&Back
Colorlnternet=9999CC&BackColorlntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2009) (recommending that public prosecutors take into account the views and
concerns of victims and ensure that victims are informed of their rights and developments in
the procedures; also recommending that victims "should be able to challenge decisions of
public prosecutors not to prosecute"); CoE, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation to Member
States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure, 387th
mtg. Ministers' Deputies, Doc. No. Rec(85)1 lE (June 28, 1985), available at https://
wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=697267&Site=CM&BackColorlnternet=9999CC&BackColornt
ranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Commit-
tee of Ministers' Recommendation on the Position of the Victim in Criminal Law]; CoE,
Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation to Member States on Participation of the Public in
Crime Policy, 29, 361th Mtg. Ministers' Deputies, Doc. No. Rec(83)7E (June 23, 1983)
available at https://wcd.coe.intlViewDoc.jsp?id=690249&Site=CM&BackColorlntemet=
9999CC&BackColorlntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 (last visited Oct. 4,
2009) (calling for the establishment of "an efficient system of legal aid for victims so that they
may have access to justice in all circumstances"); Council Framework Decision on the Stand-
ing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings 2001/220/JHA, 2001 O.J. (L 82) 1 (EU).
156. Heifer, supra note 12, at 135-39.
[Vol. 31:157
Prosecuting Torturers
The subject of victims' rights in international law, even when nar-
rowed to the jurisprudence of regional tribunals, is too broad to be
exhaustively examined in this Article. Rather, this Article focuses on the
rights of victims now recognized in human rights law that come most
directly into conflict with the due process model and the rights of the
accused-the "substantive" rights. The most advanced of these is the right
of the victim to have the criminal punished.
The term "right to punishment" is rarely used in human rights law
and scholarship.17 A more widely used term is "right to justice," which
has a somewhat different meaning. This latter term is usually used in the
context of transitional justice to describe the right of the victims of grave
human rights violations' 58 to seek prosecution and punishment of those
responsible.'59 As is evident, this right is broader than a "right to punish-
ment," because it presumably includes a right of access to some kind of
legal process in which victims may present their claims, and in which the
claims may be investigated with the purpose of imposition of criminal
(as opposed to merely civil or disciplinary) sanctions, if the accused is
found guilty.'6°
157. It is also rarely used in literature on criminal law and criminology, although some
exceptions exist. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Justifying Punishment, 14 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE
161, 196(2001).
158. A concept of "grave" or "serious" violations of human rights is difficult to define,
but it evidently includes such acts as extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and torture.
See Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to
Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197 n.5 (1996).
159. See Impunity Guidelines, supra note 146, at 12, princ. 19. Another important recent
document concerning these issues is the Remedy Guidelines, supra note 154. Cf DOAK, supra
note 11, at 175 (discussing the rights to justice of victims of common crime).
160. Principle 19 of the Impunity Principles describes the right to justice in the follow-
ing terms:
States shall undertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations
of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and take appropri-
ate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of criminal
justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under international law
are prosecuted, tried and duly punished.
Impunity Guidelines, supra note 146, at 12, princ. 19. The document characteristically omits
the requirement of guilt to be proven, but the Remedy Principles pay more attention to the due
process aspect:
In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations
of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States
have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty,
the duty to punish her or him.
Remedy Guidelines, supra note 154, 4 (emphasis added).
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S 161Jonathan Doak identifies the victims' rights to protection, partici-
pation, justice (including the right to truth),' 62 and reparation as distinct
rights recognized today under various human rights instruments. This
approach unwittingly subsumes the emerging and rather controversial
right to punishment under the seemingly innocuous broader category of
the right to justice. However, it is often difficult to draw a clear line be-
tween the right to punishment and the right to justice.
The same can be said about the right to have criminal prohibitions in
place or to have crimes against a person effectively investigated. For ex-
ample, although human rights tribunals sometimes insist that the state
duty to investigate effectively is one of "process rather than result," it
often appears that the test for the effectiveness of the process involves, to
a large extent, considering whether the desired result has been or could
have been achieved.
Because of the close interconnectedness of these rights to punish-
ment, justice, effective investigation, and criminal prohibition, they are
considered in this Article together as a set of evolving substantive rights
of victims in human rights law.
B. The Dark Side of Progress: New Victims'Rights
and the Erosion of Due Process Values
1. Latin America
The Inter-American system of human rights protection is of particu-
lar interest in the context of this Article because, unlike other
international human rights institutions, from its very beginning it devel-
oped a decidedly victim-oriented jurisprudence and was open about its
departure from a due process orientation.'
63
One factor in forming this focus on victims was undoubtedly the his-
torical period when it came into being. During the late 1980s and 1990s,
many OAS member states struggled with the consequences of the brutal
civil conflict and state-orchestrated violence that had characterized the
previous decades, as well as the subsequent problems of impunity.
Significantly, as outlined above, the 1980s saw the rise of victimol-
ogy in international institutions, and academia, and policy solutions in
161. The right to protection includes protection from both primary victimization, result-
ing from crime itself, and secondary victimization, resulting from traumatic experiences in the
process of investigation and trial (e.g. humiliation, lack of respect for privacy, and witness
intimidation). DOAK, supra note 11, at 5 1.
162. Id. at 180.
163. See infra Part IHI(B)(I)(b) (discussing Bulacio v. Argentina, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 100 (Sept. 18, 2003)).
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the major western states. 6 As a consequence, human rights institutions
in the Americas never went through a defendant-focused stage. However,
ironically, the Inter-American institutions had to apply basic texts'65 that
were the product of a different age when the scholarship indeed did fo-
cus on the rights of criminal defendants rather than on the rights of
victims.
In a string of decisions stretching from Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Hon-
duras'66 to Albdn-Cornejo v. Ecuador,167 the Inter-American Court has
recognized the right of victims to have crimes against them vigorously
investigated and, at least where the person responsible has been identi-
fied, to have such person punished. This right extends to crimes against
personal and physical integrity committed by state agents and private
actors. The Court has also recognized that some barriers to prosecution
violate the American Convention on Human Rights if they unfairly re-
strict these rights of victims.
a. Duty to Investigate the Crimes of State:
Veldsquez-Rodriguez and Barrios Altos
In its pioneering decision in Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras" the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights adopted a broad interpretation of
the state obligation to "ensure" the enjoyment of rights guaranteed by
the American Convention.' 69 As in many cases in the Inter-American
system, the case concerned a crime of state: a forced disappearance as
part of a campaign of terror sponsored by state security forces.
70
164. For example, both the U.N. Declaration of the Principles of Justice for Victims and
the Committee of Ministers' Recommendation on the Position of the Victim in Criminal Law
were adopted in 1985. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation
R(85)11 on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure,
387th mtg. of the Ministers' Deputies (June 28, 1985), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/
human-rights/cddh/3.-committees/06.%20terroism%20(dh-s-ter)/working%20documents/2004/
2004-004-en.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
165. The institutions had to apply the American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 82, and occasionally the American Declaration, supra note 85.
166. VelIsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29,
1988).
167. Albdn-Comejo v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171 96 (Nov. 22,
2007).
168. See Veldsquez-Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
169. Article I of the American Convention requires states parties to the Convention to
respect and ensure to all persons within their jurisdiction specific rights and freedoms guaran-
teed by the Convention. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82, art. 1.
Veldsquez-Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 166-67.
170. Veldsquez-Rodriguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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In one of the Court's most influential decisions,'7' the obligation to
"ensure" rights was interpreted to include the duty to investigate and
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention. 72 This
duty to punish, in Court's view, was part and parcel of the general posi-
tive obligation of states to prevent violations of rights under the
Convention. Moreover, the Court indicated that the punishment must be
"appropriate."'73
The Court did not mention any limitations as to exactly which rights
under the Convention imposed these positive obligations. Nor did the
Court add any caveats to limit the application of this interpretation of the
obligation to "ensure" to any particular group of rights. Instead the case
laid out principles that were further developed by the Court in later cas-
es.
Veldsquez-Rodriguez involved de facto impunity, since national law
prohibited the acts that occurred but the law was not enforced. Later,
however, the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court also
had to deal with de jure impunity, which arose when many Latin Ameri-
can governments granted broad amnesties to persons who had committed
crimes against humanity and gross violations of human rights. There
were several types of amnesties, including those granted by the regime
responsible for human rights violations while still in power (the so-
171. The European Court of Human Rights referred to the Veldsquez-Rodriguez judg-
ment in at least eight of its own cases, including some of the most important published
decisions. See Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 399 11 (Bonello, J., dis-
senting); Ertak v. Turkey, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 157 106; Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-Ill Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1152 67; Akdivar v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1192 68. For a reference to
Veldsquez-Rodriguez in the context of the African regional human rights system, see Nsongu-
rua J. Udombana, So Far So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
172. The Court held that Article 1 of the American Convention obligated states to "re-
spect the rights and freedoms" recognized in the Convention, an obligation the Court
interpreted to be "negative" in nature, and that it provided limits on the exercise of public
authority. Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 165
(July 29, 1988). However, the obligation to "ensure" the enjoyment of rights under the Con-
vention is of positive nature and implies:
[T]he duty of States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general,
all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable
of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a conse-
quence of this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible at-
tempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for





called "self-amnesties"),'74 and those granted by the regime that was es-
tablished after the transition from military to democratic rule.
75
Amnesties could also be enacted by an old regime but accepted by the
new regime as part of the process of transition. 7 6 In the 1990s, the Court
and the Inter-American Commission faced claims challenging such am-
nesty laws.'7
This was the context of the next major Inter-American case that de-
veloped the doctrine of the right to punishment, Barrios Altos v. Peru.17"
Barrios Altos arose from the activities of state-sponsored anti-terrorist
units during the rule of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. In 1991,
one such unit committed a mass killing of individuals apparently thought
to be terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. 7 9 An investigation linked the
crime to certain officials in the state security services and a criminal
prosecution was opened against them. In order to protect the security
personnel from prosecution the legislature adopted a law providing for a
blanket amnesty of all persons connected to the security services impli-
cated in the case. Eventually this law was challenged by the Inter-
American Commission before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.
The Court held that self-amnesties, enacted by a political regime to
relieve its own agents from liability for their crimes, violated the Ameri-
can Convention: not only Articles 4 (right to life) and 5 (right to humane
treatment) but also Articles 8 (right to a fair trial) and 25 (right to judi-
cial protection).8 As in Veldsquez-Rodriguez, the Court relied on a
174. Barrios Altos, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), 2(i), (k), (m) (labeling the Peru-
vian amnesty law at issue a "self-amnesty" which, the Court held, was impermissible under
the American Convention).
175. Consuelo v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311 (Ar-
gentina), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1993); Mendoza
v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, 10.375 (Uruguay),
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/92, 2-7 (1992).
176. Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26,
2006).
177. Consuelo, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311 (Argentina), Inter-
Am. C.H.R., T41; Mendoza, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374,
10.375 (Uruguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., 46, 49.
178. Barrios Altos, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
179. Id. 2.
180. Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights reads:
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective re-
course, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or
by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by per-
sons acting in the course of their official duties.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82, art. 25.
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broad reading of the general obligation of states to respect and ensure
rights under the Convention and, more importantly, to give domestic ef-
fect to all of the Convention rights and freedoms.'8' The case
demonstrated the Court's willingness to strike down and set aside tech-
nical procedural barriers to prosecution and punishment established by
domestic laws.
Initially it seemed that the rationale behind Veldsquez-Rodriguez and
Barrios Altos only applied in the context of systematic, state-orchestrated,
mass violations of human rights, where victims were denied not only the
right to have their offender punished but also the even more basic right to
have violations diligently investigated. However, cases such as Bula-
cio v. Argentina'12 and Albdn-Cornejo v. Ecuador 3 have shown that
recognition of victims' right to punishment extends beyond mass human
right violations by state actors, and applies to individual and private vio-
lations as well. Moreover, the Bulacio case has highlighted how this
newly recognized right to punishment can come into conflict with more
traditional due process rights of the accused.
b. Victims' Rights Confront Due Process: Bulacio v. Argentina
Seventeen-year-old Walter Bulacio was picked up by the police in a
massive sweep in front of a stadium, where he planned to attend a rock
concert. While detained, he was beaten and later died from his injuries. ' 1
The officer responsible for his death was identified as police captain Mi-
guel Angel Esp6sito. Although the incident occurred in 1991, it was
followed by an extraordinarily protracted procedure against Mr.
Esp6sito, with numerous in limine and interlocutory appeals, and was
not resolved until 2002 when the charges were dismissed because the
statute of limitations had run.'8 5
After the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights lodged the
application against Argentina with the Inter-American Court, the family
of the deceased, the state and the Commission reached a friendly settle-
ment. In the agreement, the state acknowledged that it had violated the
American Convention by detaining Walter Bulacio without sufficient
legal grounds, causing his death, and failing to investigate the death
181. Id. art. 2.
182. Bulacio v. Argentina, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100 (Sept. 18, 2003).
183. AlbAn-Cornejo v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171 (Nov. 22,
2007).
184. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICE VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA: TORTURE AND POLICE
KILLINGS IN BUENOS AIRES 44-45 (1991).
185. Bulacio, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 1 3, § 25.
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within a reasonable time-period. 6 The parties, however, also asked the
Inter-American Court to rule on certain points of law in the case. 7
Complying with this request, the Court again reaffirmed that states
parties to the American Convention have a duty to investigate human
rights violations and to punish those responsible. 8 The Court held, more
broadly, that effective enjoyment of human rights under the Convention
required that states take measures to punish deprivations of the right to
life and other human right violations.'89 In doing so, the Court again
equated the duty to investigate alleged violations of human rights, a duty
established by its previous case law, with the duty to punish alleged per-
petrators.' 9° Significantly, the court acknowledged that the duty to punish
applied not to a massive, state-ordered violation but to an isolated act by
a police officer acting without political motivations or command from
above.
Addressing the procedural aspects of the case, the Court noted that
Mr. Esp6sito's defense counsel filed a substantial number of motions
preventing the proceedings from progressing toward their "natural cul-
mination."' 9' It is not entirely clear what this "natural" culmination was
understood to be but, given the Court's recognition of the right to pun-
ishment, the natural culmination would appear to be conviction and
punishment of the accused.
The Court stated that exercise of the defense rights in this case
amounted to abuse of rights. The Court then delivered an argument
which can be seen in many ways as the culmination of the recent Inter-
American jurisprudence regarding victims' rights and their impact on the
rights of the accused. It stated:
This manner of exercising the means that the law makes avail-
able to the defense counsel has been tolerated and allowed by
the intervening judiciary bodies, forgetting that their function is
not exhausted by enabling due process that guarantees defense
at a trial, but that they must also ensure, within a reasonable
time, the right of the victim or his or her next of kin to learn the







190. Compare id. 1112 (speaking of "effective investigation" of the alleged violations)
with id. Il1 (stating that effective enjoyment of rights is possible only where violations are
"punished").
191. Id. 113.
192. Id. T 114 (emphasis added).
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The Court then faced the issue of balance between the rights of the ac-
cused and the rights of victims head-on, concluding that the way to
guarantee the rights of victims was to limit, where necessary, the due
process rights of the accused. In the Court's view, domestic criminal
judges had a duty to direct criminal proceedings in a way that would en-
sure that delays and hindrances (related to the exercise of the rights of
the accused) would not lead to "impunity."'93
Perhaps even more strikingly, the Court held that the statute of limi-
tations or "any other domestic legal obstacle that attempts to impede the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for human rights vio-
lations are [sic] inadmissible."' 
94
In practical terms this judgment of the Inter-American Court meant
that the case against captain Esp6sito had to be reopened. In Argentina
judgments of the Inter-American Court have constitutional status and are
incorporated into the domestic legal order. Taking guidance from the
judgment of the Inter-American Court, the Argentinian Supreme Court
of Justice reinstated charges against Mr. Esp6sito. Even as it did so, the
Argentine Court found that reinstatement of charges might violate the
national constitutional right of Captain Esp6sito to be tried within rea-
sonable time. The Argentine Court noted that in practical terms the
resolution of this case meant the need to subordinate the traditional
rights of the accused under the national constitution to the rights of the
victims recognized by the Inter-American Convention.' 9
Bulacio highlights the tension between due process and victims'
rights in international human rights law. But how broad is its reach? To
what categories of cases should its principles-which put concerns about
the rights of victims decidedly above procedural rights of the accused
and procedural barriers to prosecution-apply? These principles, enun-
ciated most explicitly in Bulacio but based on previous developments in
Veldsquez-Rodriguez and Barrios Altos, could be interpreted in a limited
fashion. In this limited interpretation the "strong" victims' rights would
only apply to the cases where the alleged criminal was a state agent,
even acting without specific state authority (as in Bulacio).
However, subsequent developments of the case law make this lim-
ited interpretation difficult to sustain. Specifically, the Court's holding in
Albdn-Cornejo v. Ecuador makes clear that the Court is willing to extend
193. Id. 115.
194. Id. 116. The Court founded these conclusions on its broad reading of Articles 1
(obligation to respect and ensure) and 2 (obligation to give domestic legal effect to the Con-
vention rights) of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 25 (right to judicial
protection), which the Court interpreted, as in Barrios Altos, to guarantee to the victims the
right to have their offenders criminally punished.
195. Basch, supra note 26, at 209-10.
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the rationale underlying Bulacio beyond the crimes of state agents and
"political" crimes to at least some common crimes, and even criminal
negligence. '96
c. Beyond Crimes of the State: Albdn-Cornejo v. Ecuador
Alben-Cornejo v. Ecuador arose from a medical malpractice case.
When the applicants' daughter died while hospitalized, the applicants
attempted to bring civil, disciplinary, and criminal cases alleging mal-
practice against the doctors involved. The Inter-American Court's
judgment concerned primarily the progress of criminal charges against
the doctors. The Court held that failure by the Ecuadorian authorities to
investigate allegations in a criminal complaint in a timely manner and
failure to institute criminal proceedings against the suspects constituted
violations of Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention.'97 The
Court also found that the lack of an effective investigation constituted
inhumane treatment of the applicants.'98
One of the bases for the Court's decision was that Ecuadorian law
and practice did not allow private parties (the applicants) to press
charges against the doctors even though the authorities showed no enthu-
siasm to investigate the malpractice.' 99
In this context the Court reiterated that the duty to investigate
alleged violations of human rights, a duty recognized since Veldsquez-
Rodriguez, must be discharged "in a serious manner, not as a mere
formality."200 The Court held that state authorities must take official ini-
tiative in such investigations and may not rely on prodding, procedural
initiative, or evidence supplied by the victim or her next of kin.20 ' Fur-
ther, the public body in charge of the investigation must take all such
steps and make all such inquiries as may be necessary to achieve the
goal of the investigation. An investigation falling short of these standards
would not be deemed effective under the American Convention.
196. This trend in the Inter-American jurisprudence has generated some internal debate
at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has been attempting to
refrain from expanding its interpretations concerning the duty of states to investigate and pun-
ish crimes beyond those associated with state authorities. Interview with Paolo G. Carozza,
Chairman, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at Notre Dame Law School, South
Bend., Ind. (Nov. 6, 2008).





201. Id. 62; see also Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 160, 255 (Nov. 25, 2006); VelAsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 177 (July 29, 1988).
202. Albdn-Cornejo, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., T 62.
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Although Albdn-Cornejo did not directly require punishment of hu-
man rights violations, the judgment did make it clear that criminal
sanction is essential to the protection of rights under the Convention.0 3
While formulated in procedural rather than result-oriented terms, the
duty to investigate remains largely result-oriented: the test seemingly
applied by the Court assessed whether the investigation at issue was
conducted in a manner that would result in punishment. Albdn-Cornejo
also completed the process of expansion of positive duties of states in the
criminal justice field from the area of state crime into the sphere of
common criminality.
This robust and progressively developing jurisprudence has led to
the agreement within the Inter-American system that victims of human
rights violations and their next of kin have an enforceable, substantive
right to ensure that perpetrators are criminally punished'0 4 This fight ap-
pears to apply not only to violations committed by state agents, but also,
as Albdn-Cornejo suggests, to violations of American Convention rights
by private actors.
2. Europe
In several lines of cases analyzed in this section, the European Court
of Human Rights recognized a number of substantive victims' fights,
including rights to protection from attacks on life20 5 and on personal in-
tegrity2°6 and the fight to demand effective investigation capable of
leading to identification and prosecution of the perpetrator.2 0 7 The Court
also recognizes the duty of the state to take proactive measures to protect
life when there is a specific threat of criminal attack.0 The European
Court does not explicitly require states to punish human rights viola-
tions. Like the Inter-American Court, it eliminates legal barriers to
criminal liability for serious human fights violations, such as statutes of
limitation, which it sees as unfair to victims. 2°6 In a line of decisions that
has no direct parallels in the Inter-American practice, the European
Court also requires criminalization of certain forms of behavior to pro-
203. ld. 135.
204. Carlos Ayala Corao, Remarks at the Third Thematic Conference on Human Rights
and International Criminal Law, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Neth. (Sept. 20, 2008); Basch,
supra note 26, at 212.
205. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1996).
206. Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260.
207. TRECHSEL, supra note 79, at 37 (analyzing X. & Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1985)).
208. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124.
209. Abdulsamet Yaman v. Turkey, App. No. 32446/96,40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 (2005).
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tect individuals from private criminal attacks on their rights.2 ° This Sec-
tion first examines the European duty to criminalize and then looks at
victims' rights to effective investigation and prosecution.
a. An Expanding Duty to Criminalize
i. Protection of Life and Physical Integrity:
Osman v. United Kingdom and A. v. United Kingdom
In 1998 the European Court first pronounced that the state has a duty
not only to abstain from arbitrarily taking lives but also to take "appro-
priate steps" to safeguard the lives of individuals within its jurisdiction.'
In Osman v. United Kingdom, the Court clarified that these appropriate
steps must include, first and foremost, imposition of a criminal law net-
work that provides effective punishments to deter the commission of
violent crimes.22
Moreover, the Court recognized that in certain well-defined circum-
stances the state has a positive obligation to take preventive operational
measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal
acts of another individual.21 3 The Court acknowledged that the imposition
of such a duty on states could potentially cause a clash with due process
guarantees and the right of citizens to respect of their private and family
life.2
14
The Court has also recognized a duty to protect in the context of Ar-
ticle 3, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment,
stating that the state has a duty to protect children from criminal actions
of their parents, even within their own homes.2 5 In A. v. United King-
dom, the European Court held that the defense of "reasonable
chastisement," which could be offered in response to a charge of assault
under English law, was too broad to adequately guarantee to children the
210. Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 289; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1; A. v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2692.
211. L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1390, 1 36.
212. Osman, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 115. Also, the state must have in place effective
law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression, and sanctioning of breaches of
such criminal law provisions. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. 116. The three Osman requirements (law, law-enforcement mechanisms, and
operational measures) were stressed and reaffirmed by the Court on a number of other occa-
sions. See, e.g., Edwards v. United Kingdom, 2002-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (finding a violation of
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights based on the failure of prison authori-
ties to properly screen an inmate who murdered the applicants' son, his fellow inmate);
Keenan v. United Kingdom, 2001-IlI Eur. Ct. H.R. 93 (finding a violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights where prison authorities had failed to monitor a sui-
cide-prone inmate); Ihan v. Turkey, 2000-VH Eur. Ct. H.R. 267; Kiliq v. Turkey, 2000-1IH Eur.
Ct. H.R. 75.
215. Z. v. United Kingdom, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment in the form of
corporal punishment.2 6
ii. Respect for Private and Family Life: X. & Y. v.
Netherlands and M. C. v. Bulgaria
The seminal case establishing a duty to criminalize attacks on the
private life of individuals by other private individuals is X. & Y v. Neth-
erlands.1 7 In X. & Y, a father brought a criminal complaint alleging that
the defendant had sexually abused his mentally disabled daughter. The
compliant was dismissed, however, due to a loophole in Dutch criminal
law: as the victim was over sixteen years of age, she was legally required
to bring the complaint herself rather than through her representatives, but
was unable to do so since she was mentally incompetent.1 8
In the Court's opinion, Article 8 required states not only to abstain
from interference with the private life of individuals (a negative obliga-
tion), but also to adopt measures designed to secure respect for private
life, even in the sphere of relations between private individuals (a posi-
tive obligation). 2'9 The next question faced by the Court was whether
civil remedies available under Dutch law (i.e., damages and injunctions)
provided sufficient recourse to the victim. While noting that there were
different ways of ensuring respect for private life and that criminal law
was not "necessarily the only answer, 220 the Court found that the civil
protections available in this case were insufficient. The Court reasoned
that in cases like this effective deterrence was "indispensable" and could
be achieved only through criminal law provisions. 22 ' Therefore the Court
found a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention.
Article 8 was applied similarly in the more recent case of M.C. v.
Bulgaria.222 In M. C., the applicant accused a male acquaintance of raping
her. After an extensive investigation, the prosecutor dismissed the crimi-
nal complaint. In the prosecutor's view, it was impossible to establish the
216. A. v. United Kingdom, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2692 24.
217. X. & Y. v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1985). It should be noted that
as early as 1979 the European Court held that ensuring respect for private and family life un-
der Article 8 of the Convention might require positive steps on the part of the state. See
Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, 31 (1979).
218. X. & Y, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6, T 12.
219. Id. T 23. It has been noted by commentators that the European Court of Human
Rights in this case applied the German constitutional doctrine of Drittwirkung (or third party
effect), under which private parties receive protection of the Constitution against violations of
rights by other private parties. However, the European Court in X. & Y did not specifically
invoke the doctrine. George P. Fletcher, Justice and Fairness in the Protection of Crime Vic-
tims, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. Rev. 547, 552 (2005).
220. X. & Y, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6, 1 24.
221. Id. T 27.
222. M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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crime of rape under Bulgarian law given the evidence in the case. Proof
of rape under Bulgarian law at the time required a showing that the vic-
tim was coerced into sexual intercourse by physical force or threats223 or
that the victim was incapable of defending herself.24 There was no evi-
dence of physical violence. Instead, the evidence in the case consisted of
the applicant's and defendant's conflicting accounts: the former insisted
that coercion was used, while the latter claimed that the applicant gave
'25her consent.
The European Court found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of
inhuman and degrading treatment)226 and Article 8 (right to respect for
private life). The Court held that, in accordance with contemporary stan-
dards and "trends" in this area of jurisprudence, a member state's
positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 required "penalization and
effective prosecution of any non-consensual sexual act, including in the
absence of physical resistance by the victim."'227 Essentially this holding
could be understood to require member states to criminalize all non-
consensual sexual acts.
iii. Prohibition of Forced Labor: Siliadin v. France
One of the most recent developments in this line of cases is Sili-
adin v. France in which an applicant successfully argued that French
criminal law provided insufficient and ineffective protection against
"servitude. 228
The applicant, a fifteen-year old Togolese national, resided in France
illegally 229 and worked as a domestic servant for a married couple with
four children. Subject to an agreement approved by her family, the appli-
cant worked without payment for her services 230 allegedly in exchange
for a promise that the couple would help regularize her immigration
231status. When discovered, the "employers" were charged with several
crimes, including "obtaining services from an individual without pay-
ment by taking advantage of that person's vulnerability or state of
dependence" and "subjecting an individual to working or living
223. Id. 64.
224. Id. 74.
225. Id. 11 11-31. Under Bulgarian law, consent was a defense if victim had reached the
age of fourteen years, unless an older victim "could not grasp the meaning of the events owing
to a mental disorder." Id. IT 72-73.
226. Article 3 provides that "[n]o one shall be subjectcd to torture or to inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment." ECHR, supra note 13, art. 3.
227. MC., 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 166 (emphasis added).
228. Siliadin v. France, 2005-VH Eur. Ct. H.R. 289.
229. Id. 1 10.
230. Id. ( 14-15.
231. Id. 17.
Fall 2009]
Michigan Journal of International Law
conditions incompatible with human dignity by taking advantage of the
person's vulnerability or state of dependence"
2 32
Initially the French lower court found the defendants guilty on both
charges, sentenced them to twelve months of imprisonment, and
awarded the applicant civil compensation. Although the appellate court
reversed the conviction and denied civil compensation, the French Court
of Cassation later quashed the reversal with respect to the civil damages
and remanded the case. Ultimately the lower court found that the defen-
dants had indeed obtained services without payment by exploiting the
victim's vulnerable or dependent state, but that they had not submitted
Ms. Siliadin to working in conditions "incompatible with human dig-
nity"233 The court did not reinstate the criminal penalties and awarded
only civil compensation.23 Ultimately the decision amounted to a civil
finding of fact and an order to pay compensation, rather than a criminal
conviction of the "employers" under French procedural law.235
On further appeal, the European Court held that France had violated
Article 4 of the Convention (prohibition of slavery and forced labor).236
In so finding the Court relied in part on its previous cases, discussed
above, which imposed on states the affirmative duty to criminalize cer-
tain conduct.237 Also of import to the Court's decision was the fact that
232. Id. 120.
233. Id. 26-27. In a separate civil action, the applicant was also awarded back pay for
the services rendered. Id. 1$ 44-45.
234. Id. 139.
235. Id. 146.
236. Article 4 of the European Convention reads:
t. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall
not include:
a. any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed
according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during
conditional release from such detention;
b. any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors
in countries where they are [recognized], service exacted instead of com-
pulsory military service;
c. any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the
life or well-being of the community;
d. any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
ECHR, supra note 13, art. 4.
237. Siliadin v. France, 2005-VIl Eur. Ct. H.R. 289 H 80, 112, 143. In A. v. United
Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights held that failure to criminalize corporal pun-
ishment of children amounted to a violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or




the applicant was a minor, which in the Court's view entitled her to a
particularly vigorous protection of law.138 The Court found that Article 4
of the Convention imposed positive obligations on member states to cri-
minalize and obtain "effective prosecution" of "any act aimed at
maintaining a person in such a situation" constituting servitude, forced,
or compulsory labor.239
In the Court's view, the French system was flawed in that its crimi-
nal law did not completely prohibit servitude and forced labor; the
prohibitions that did exist were too limited and failed to cover all possi-
ble forms of exploitation. 240 Because the court had overturned
defendants' convictions and only had required them to pay civil compen-
sation, the Court found that "the applicant.., was not able to see those
responsible for the wrongdoing convicted under criminal law," as the
Court believed the Convention required.4
The prohibition on forced labor has been the last addition to the pro-
hibitions which, according to the European Court's case law must be
reinforced by criminal sanction. However, the state of the Court's case
law would suggest that this requirement of criminalization could well be
extended in the future to other areas, for instance freedom of religion.
iv. Implications of the Duty to Criminalize for
Models of Criminal Process
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a robust juris-
prudence regarding the positive obligation of states to criminalize and
punish certain conduct. This is somewhat surprising because criminaliza-
tion decisions are supposed to be based heavily on societal moral
standards and attitudes.243 Arguably, it is not easy to find international
consensus over such standards and particularly in borderline cases.
In part, the willingness of the Court to expand the European duty to
criminalize can be explained by the fact that obligations to criminalize
are widespread in international law in general. However, the approach of
the European Court appears to be unique. In particular, the Court's will-
ingness to expand the European Convention's applicability to private
238. Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79-81, 87.
239. Id. 112.
240. Id. U 141-42.
241. Id.A 145.
242. The Court has recognized that the rights protected by Article 9 (freedom to have
and to manifest one's religion) of the European Convention may impose positive obligations
on a state. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 9. The Court has not yet imposed on member states the
duty to criminalize violations of this right, but gave its approval to criminal measures used by
Austria to ensure protection of this right in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1994), reprinted in 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1995).
243. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6-8 (1967).
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relations stands in contrast to resistance of general international law to
recognize such applicability. 2"
However, the reasons behind development of this jurisprudence are
perhaps less significant than the effects of the new direction this juris-
prudence is taking: toward a readiness to accept uncritically that criminal
law is often the best way to ensure protection of individual rights. The
European Court's optimism about the role of criminal law is similarly
visible in the case law of the Inter-American Court.
What makes the approach applied by the European Court different
from that of the Inter-American Court is that the former requires states to
adopt generally applicable criminal laws. The Inter-American Court, by
contrast, appears also more forcefully to require prosecution and pun-
ishment of guilty individuals. For this reason, criminalization case law of
the European Court may appear not to call into question the traditional
due process model of criminal process. However, the values underlying
the due process model may be threatened by the European case law,
which represents a shift in attitude in favor of criminal law and criminal
punishment and which may erode the fidelity of states to due process
values. European human rights law operates on the assumption that spe-
cial consequences follow from a charge or a law being labeled
"criminal," as the European Court demonstrated in Engel v. Nether-
lands.245 It noted:
In a society subscribing to the rule of law, there belong to the
"criminal" sphere deprivations of liberty liable to be imposed as
a punishment, except those which by their nature, duration or
manner of execution cannot be appreciably detrimental. The se-
riousness of what is at stake, the traditions of the Contracting
States and the importance attached by the Convention to respect
for the physical liberty of the person all require that this should
be so .... 246
This passage shows that the essential feature of being "criminal" is
an association with punishment. This is perhaps a rather obvious point
that is nevertheless worth recalling. Under European human rights law,
to have a "criminal" law means to have punitive law. Therefore implicit
in decisions requiring criminalization is an endorsement of criminal pun-
ishment-as opposed to other forms of legal regulation-as a means of
protecting human rights. The due process model of criminal process is,
244. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 6, 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).




at its core, skeptical about the moral propriety and desirability of crimi-
nal punishment as a method of social regulation. 47 For this reason, the
optimism about criminal law reflected in the European Court's recent
case law may undermine its commitment to due process values in gen-
eral.
b. The Duty to Investigate and The Duty to Prosecute
In addition to the line of decisions requiring criminalization, the
European Court has also recently developed expansive case law requir-
ing states to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations.
This case law, despite its more cautious and nuanced attitude, is strongly
reminiscent of the victim-centered decisions of the Inter-American insti-
tutions.
The European Court of Human Rights first recognized a state duty to
investigate killings committed by state agents-stemming from Article 2
of the European Convention (right to life)-in McCann v. United King-
dom. 248 However, since this procedural duty was not central to the
McCann decision, the duty received more expansive treatment in Aksoy
v. Turkey.249 In Aksoy, the Court considered an applicant's claim of multi-
ple human rights violations by the Turkish authorities; specifically, he
claimed that he had been detained for fourteen days without presentation
to a judge and that he been tortured, based on the suspicion that he was
involved in PKK (Kurdish underground party and terrorist organization)
activities. The European Court eventually found violations of Articles 3
(freedom from torture), 5 (right to personal liberty) and 13 (right to ef-
fective remedy) of the Convention.
Analyzing the violation under Article 13, the Court noted that the
scope of obligations under Article 13 depends on the nature of the sub-
stantive right violated. 5' Because the right involved in this case (the right
to be free from torture) was one of the most fundamental of rights, the
Court imposed a requirement of "thorough and effective investigation."
252
247. Packer, supra note 9, at 20.
248. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 161 (1996).
249. Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 98.
250. Id. 64 (Article 3), 78, 84 (Article 5), 100 (Article 13). Mr. Aksoy also alleged a
violation of Article 6(1) (right to a fair trial), but the Court refused to rule on this claim be-
cause the applicant failed to even attempt to file a civil lawsuit. By doing so, the Court in
effect accepted that Article 6(1) was inapplicable to criminal charges brought by a victim and
only guaranteed "right to a court" in civil matters. Here the difference with jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is apparent. It
was mentioned-but was not dispositive for the Court-that according to Mr. Aksoy, under
the Turkish law and practice he could not successfully seek civil damages given the failure of
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Accordingly, in a claim concerning Article 13 (right to effective
remedy), where an individual has an arguable claim that he has been tor-
tured by agents of the state, the notion of an "effective remedy" entails,
in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thor-
ough and effective investigation. This investigation must be capable of
leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and
must allow for effective access for the complainant to the investigatory
procedure.53
The standard of appropriate state behavior in such cases includes: (1)
effective investigation, (2) capable of leading to (3) identification and (4)
punishment of (5) those responsible and (6) effective access of the vic-
tim to the investigatory procedure.2- The right has to be effective in
practice and theory and this, according to the Aksoy judgment, means
that exercise of this right must not be hindered by the acts or omissions
of the state authorities. 255 Elsewhere, the Court also added the require-
ment of "promptness and reasonable expedition" in investigation. 56
The Court on multiple occasions stressed that the obligation of effec-
tive investigation "is not one of result, but of means." That is, a state
must take all reasonable steps available to secure the evidence concern-
ing an incident.72 In its more recent judgments the Court expanded
application of this rule to violations of other Articles of the European
Convention, including violation of the right to personal freedom in cases
involving forced disappearances committed by military forces28 and vio-
lation of the right to life in fatal police beatings.29
In subsequent cases the Court also developed numerous require-
ments that the procedure of investigation has to meet in order to satisfy
the Aksoy standard. For example, investigating officials are required to
be impartial and both de jure and de facto independent of state agents
suspected of the violation. 260 Additionally, the investigation should be
subject to some degree of public scrutiny, including the victim's right to
be involved in the proceedings in order to effectively safeguard her inter-
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. This rule, like rules formulated by Inter-American human rights institutions, does
not require states to prove the guilt of those identified as perpetrators of human rights abuses.
However, in contrast to the Inter-American system, the approach of the European Court seems
to be more consistent, because it does not require (at least on its face) states to actually punish
those responsible, focusing instead on investigation capable of bringing about punishment. Id.
255. Id. T 95.
256. Abdillsamet Yaman v. Turkey, App. No. 32446/96,40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 (2005).
257. Anguelova v. Bulgaria, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355 91139; Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-Ill
Eur. Ct. H.R. I 152 1140.
258. See Kurt, 1998-111 Eur. Ct. H.R.
259. See Anguelova, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
260. See Ogur v. Turkey, 1999-IUI Eur. Ct. H.R. 519.
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ests.26' Moreover, in several cases, the Court pointed to a failure to col-
lect specific evidence (such as an autopsy, additional witnesses, or
forensic evidence)2 62 and found the state in violation on this account. In
short, the procedural requirements developed by the Court are elaborate
and detailed.
The Court, facing in case after case a failure to investigate crimes
committed by the security personnel and the police, spells out one pro-
cedural requirement after another. The Court's reasoning suggests,
however, that the Court is trying to achieve a substantive goal in formu-
lating these procedural requirements: the effective protection of the
individual rights in question (right to life, right to personal integrity etc.).
But does an investigation which was effective enough to result in identi-
fication of the accused satisfy the requirement of the effective remedy
under the Convention if this accused eventually goes unpunished?
Abdiilsamet Yaman v. Turkey,263 a case with strong parallels to Bula-
cio v. Argentina, suggests not. Mr. Yaman, a Kurdish political activist,
was detained and allegedly tortured in a Turkish prison in 1995 .24 After
his release he filed a criminal complaint in connection with his alleged
mistreatment. When the prosecutor failed to open an investigation find-
ing insufficient evidence of the crime, the applicant filed his complaint
with the European Commission on Human Rights, after which the inves-
tigation was reopened and six police officers were charged with
torture.265 In 2000 Mr. Yaman moved to Germany.26 In the meantime the
Turkish court held twenty-three hearings in the case of the accused po-
lice officers. The applicant's absence was apparently a problem for the
Turkish court and it tried to call the applicant as a witness from 2000
through 2003 .267 Apparently the Turkish office responsible for procedure
before the European Court of Human Rights failed to inform the local
court that Mr. Yaman had moved to Germany.268 Partially because of this
delay, the Turkish court eventually found in 2003 that prosecution of the
police officers was time-barred.269
261. This right includes, for example, the right to be informed about key procedural
decisions, such as a decision not to prosecute. See Gilec v. Turkey, 1998-lV Eur. Ct. H.R.
1698 1 82.
262. Salman v. Turkey, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 365 106; Tanrikulu v. Turkey, 1999-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R. 457 109.
263. See Abdtilsanet Yarnan v. Turkey, App. No. 32446/96,40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49 (2005).
264. Id. I 11.
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The European Court found violations of both Article 3 (torture) and
Article 13 (lack of domestic remedy). Unlike the Inter-American Court
in Bulacio, the European Court did not make broad claims to the effect
that any barrier to prosecution was invalid. Rather, the judgment sug-
gests that the court was concerned that the law had been manipulated to
relieve the state agents from punishment-or that the state had acquitted
itself.
Moreover, the Court was concerned not merely with procedure. De-
spite its procedural rhetoric the Court appears to have been genuinely
seeking justice, in the sense of obtaining the punishment of those respon-
sible. After repeating the Aksoy standard for effective investigation and
finding that the state had failed to meet it through improper delay,27° the
Court raised a substantive objection to the resolution of the case:
Where a State agent has been charged with crimes involving tor-
ture or ill treatment, it is of the utmost importance for the
purposes of "effective remedy" that criminal proceedings and
sentencing are not time-barred and that the granting of an am-
nesty or pardon should not be permissible.27'
The Court noticeably changed the focus of its discussion from "ef-
fective investigation" to "effective remedy": certain barriers to
prosecution violate the European Convention not because of procedural
irregularities but ipsofacto, because they facilitate impunity and because
punishment is seen as the essential objective in application of human
rights law. There are evident parallels here with the approach of the In-
ter-American Court in Barrios Altos and Bulacio.
3. Two Regional Systems: A Comparison
In summary, the two regional human rights systems display different
styles and approaches in their victim-oriented jurisprudence. Despite
these differences, the general trend toward placing an increasing empha-
sis on the substantive rights of victims is clear.
The Inter-American case law recognizes the right of the victim of a
human rights violation to obtain punishment of the perpetrator. The con-
flict of this right with the due process model is clear: if there is an
enforceable substantive right to punishment belonging to victims, then
meaningful due process orientation of the criminal procedure as a whole
is called into question. The enforceable right to punishment, especially
as interpreted in Bulacio, requires that procedural guarantees of the
rights of the accused do not stand in the way of achieving substantive
270. See id. 154.
271. Id. 55 (emphasis added).
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justice for the victim. While there can be many ways to attempt to recon-
cile these conflicting rights, it is clear that they are in direct tension.
The directness and relative consistency of Inter-American Court's
approach make it a particularly attractive subject for comparison with the
case law of the European Court, which is often very nuanced and lacks
an obvious, "general trend." The more direct Inter-American case law
may reflect a general movement in international human rights law to-
ward victim-centered models of criminal justice and new punitiveness.
In Europe, the Court of Human Rights acknowledges that effective
protection of the right to life, the right to humane treatment, the right to
be free from slavery, and the right to respect for private and family life
requires the state to criminalize behavior violating such rights. The Court
also recognizes the right of the victims of human rights violations to
have violations investigated and to have the suspects prosecuted. Where
the perpetrators are state agents, the Court also prohibits some impedi-
ments to prosecution, such as statutes of limitation.
The problematic nature of the recent European case law is less obvi-
ous than the tensions inherent in the Inter-American judgments. The
European Court is less willing than the Inter-American Court to declare
the substantive nature of the victims' rights recognized in its recent ju-
risprudence. It focuses on the procedural aspects of these rights and,
more so than the Inter-American Court, allows special treatment in cases
in which where the perpetrator is a state official. These aspects of the
European Court's case law seek to avoid conflict with the traditional due
process approach. The Court also does not speak explicitly of a right to
punishment.
However, the optimism about criminal law and its power to protect
victims certainly pervades some decisions of the European Court, such
as Siliadin v. France, in which the Court displayed a preference for
criminal sanction as a way of addressing certain social problems . Al-
though perhaps less obviously than in Inter-American decisions like
Bulacio, the European Court's preference for criminal law is in direct
tension with the skepticism of criminal sanction that underlies the due
process model.273
272. The same preference for criminal law can be perceived in the Inter-American
Court's judgment in Albdn-Cornejo v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171
(Nov. 22, 2007).
273. PACKER, supra note 36, at 170.
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IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS REVOLUTION
IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. The New Human Rights Law: Toward a Punitive
Victims'Rights Model?
Of course, recognition of the rights of victims does not necessarily
require limitation of the rights of defendants. However, even victims'
rights "enthusiasts" recognize that at least some conflict exists between
the rights of victims and the rights of criminal defendants. 4 In theory,
specific holdings in cases like Bulacio, Albdn-Cornejo, and Siliadin can
be reconciled with the due process principles, in that their holdings no-
where require conviction at all costs or punishment of the innocent.
However, it is the values underlying the recent practice of the Inter-
American and the European Courts rather than their specific holdings
that are most in conflict with the traditional due process model in human
rights law. It is this shifting set of values informing human rights juris-
prudence that raises the most acute concern about the sustainability of
the due process model in international human rights law.
As described in Part II, the due process model is based on fear of a
strong state inappropriately using its powerful penal apparatus against
much less powerful individuals. To protect these individuals, criminal
justice systems applying the due process model impose procedural
checks on the exercise of the power to punish. These checks require
strict observance of procedures, sometimes even at the expense of sub-
stance: factually guilty individuals can be acquitted if necessary to
protect the rights of the accused generally. What makes this limiting and
procedural attitude sustainable is an acceptance that the evils of crime
may need to be endured in order to preserve due process protections. In
the famous words of William Blackstone, it is better that ten guilty per-
sons escape, than that one innocent suffer.275
A panoply of criminal justice standards is driven by an implicit as-
sumption that no matter how serious the criminal threat, the power of
states to address these threats should be constrained. Any invocation of
the criminal law is seen as a potential threat to civil liberties rather than a
means to protect them. In this context even minor procedural violations
that create doubt about whether the rights of an accused have been prop-
erly protected are seen to violate the right to a fair trial, and require
acquittal of a factually guilty party-a result not seen as drastic given the
underlying skepticism about punishment as an effective means of pre-
274. See Jonathan Doak, The Victim and the Criminal Process: An Analysis of Recent
Trends in Regional and International Tribunals, 23 LEGAL STUD. I, 2 (2003).
275. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *352.
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venting crime in the first place. Moreover, the realization that criminal
punishment and criminal law in general have costs is essential to the po-
litical survival of the due process model, since the natural instinct of the
ordinary citizen is to demand more not less punishment and more order
rather than "liberty" for criminals. This realization must produce certain
restraint and skepticism in the attitudes toward criminal law and reluc-
tance to its use if the model is to be sustainable.276
Although human rights courts may acknowledge due process con-
cerns, 277 it is clear that they often see other priorities as more important.
First, they increasingly require exercise of state penal power against per-
petrators, in favor of protecting victims from human rights abuses.
Second, to a much greater extent than traditional due process would al-
low, the new human rights law stresses efficiency over process. This
brings it closer to the traditional crime control values described by
Packer.27' Finally, human rights courts today often favor the use of crimi-
nal law to address social problems which they see as important, even
beyond the areas of traditional crime or traditional human rights con-
cerns. 279 The doubt about desirability and effectiveness of criminal
punishment is replaced by enthusiasm and indeed demand for such pun-
ishment.
Therefore the "message" of the recent case law-that is, its expres-
sive content-communicates values distinctly different from traditional
due process values. In doing so this case law quite clearly undercuts the
viability of the traditional due process model, or at least demands a very
serious correction of the model. But what alternative to the traditional
due process model does this new case law advance?
B. The Dangers of the New Victim-Oriented Human Rights Law
Although the two regional human rights systems are moving from
the traditional due process model toward a more punitive victims' rights
model, these courts fail to acknowledge the inherent conflict between
276. Packer, supra note 9, at 20 (arguing that underlying the due process model is skep-
ticism about criminal punishment as an appropriate tool of social control, which is seen as too
cruel or ineffective to be deployed often). Packer commented that such doubts about the ends
for which the power to punish "is being exercised create pressure to limit the discretion with
which that power is being exercised," using due process barriers to conviction. Id.
277. See, e.g., Perez v. France, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 93 T 70 (stating that there is no right
to "private revenge" for victims under the Europcan Convention); Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica,
2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 15 (July 2, 2004) (Sergio Garcia Ramirez. J.,
concurring) (arguing with approval that "the current thinking favors the so-called minimalist
approach to criminal law. In other words, moderate, restricted, marginal use of the criminal-
law apparatus....").
278. See PACKER, supra note 36, at 158.
279. For a discussion of Siliadin v. France, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 289, see supra Part III.
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due process values and the new rights of victims.2 0 This "revolution in
the dark" can potentially have a number of serious consequences.
1. Strengthening the Legitimacy of Repressive Anti-Crime Policies
Although states have a duty to protect the rights of both the crimi-
nally accused and victims, policies favoring one group inevitably harm
the other. As Part II showed, domestic political pressures normally favor
harsher measures while international human rights law plays a restrain-
ing role. However, if international law is shifting toward prioritizing the
rights of victims, the moderating influence of international law is likely
to be undermined.
Domestic experience suggests that this possibility is not purely hy-
pothetical. The fact that punitive policies can be written in human rights
language is not surprising nor is it particularly new.21 Human rights lan-
guage is one of the most powerful mediums for communicating political
ideas in many countries today,12 and its potential in this respect should
not be underestimated. Human rights law often operates through "fram-
ing": the persuasive effect of a message in some way contrary to the
attitudes of the "persuadee" is increased if the message is strategically
framed to connect to and resonate with already accepted norms.283 In this
case punitive ideas could be more acceptable to a broader audience if
they were linked to the already accepted language of rights. There is al-
ready some evidence that the message of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights is seen as a punitive one, directed against the due process
rights of the accused."' The current international victims' rights dis-
course in the field has succeeded or is close to succeeding in arming
crime control advocates with the language of rights instead of the more
traditional language of law and order.
This trend is particularly unfortunate given that regional human
rights institutions in Europe and Latin America serve a number of crimi-
nal justice systems that have systemic problems with humane treatment
280. Despite a trend toward the punitive victims' model, human rights institutions con-
tinue to proclaim their dedication to the full protection of the traditional due process rights of
the accused. See, e.g., Guti6rrez-Soler v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 132
(Sept. 12, 2005); Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114 (Sept. 7, 2004).
281. DUBBER, supra note 14, at 1-2 (noting that the very first victims' bill of rights in
the United States inserted into the California Constitution in 1982 made explicit the connec-
tion between victims' rights and the War on Crime); Roach, supra note 63, at 703.
282. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 9 (2001).
283. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 93, at 636 (citing KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 93, at
17-18).
284. Basch, supra note 26, at 218-21.
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of suspects and convicts.2 " The victims' rights case law is unlikely to
advance the work of regional systems in this humanizing effort.
2. Sending a Mixed Message About Due Process
There is a significant distinction between a shift toward a victims'
rights orientation in domestic legal systems in, for example, the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other Western and non-
Western countries with strong traditions of legality and rule of law and
the same shift in international human rights law generally. In these coun-
tries with strong rule of law traditions increased protection of victims'
rights occurs within criminal justice systems that have entrenched pro-
tections for the rights of the accused.286 Internationally, however,
improved protection for victims' rights can significantly undermine the
already feeble protections afforded criminal suspects in domestic legal
systems that disregard very basic elements of due process for criminal
defendants-for example, those systems that engage in torture to extract
confessions or conduct extra-judicial executions. In many legal systems
due process rights of the defendant have not been sufficiently estab-
lished, recognized, or protected and domestic courts may see the new
case law as legitimating their existing disregard for the rights of sus-
pects."'
Regional human rights institutions acknowledge the value of a due
process approach but at the same time advance rights of victims that are
in tension with traditional due process values. This creates a certain
cognitive dissonance-a phenomenon that occurs when a person's ac-
tions do not correspond to her pronounced ideas or principles. Studies
show that the result is often a shift in the person's attitudes, so that her
beliefs begin to reflect her actions.28 There is a risk that, as a result of
these seemingly isolated strands of victims' rights jurisprudence, entire
285. See, e.g., Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
160 (Nov. 25, 2006); Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 89; Peers v. Greece, 2001-
III Eur. Ct. H.R. 275.
286. Even in such benign contexts, increased willingness to acknowledge the concerns
of victims may undermine the traditional protections afforded criminal defendants. See, e.g.,
S.N. v. Sweden, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 145; see also John D. Jackson, The Effect of Human
Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence of Realignment,
68 MODERN L. REV. 737, 761 (2005).
287. For some examples of the brutal methods often practiced in such countries as Ecua-
dor and Colombia, see Gutidrrez-Soler v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 132,
98 (Sept. 12, 2005); Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, 1 160 (Sept.
7, 2004); BRINKS, supra note 33 (describing the incidence of extrajudicial killings of per-
ceived criminals by the police in preference to formal investigation, trial, and sentencing);
Nigel Rodley, Torture and Conditions of Detention, in THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UN-
DERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 25, 28-36 (Juan E. Mendez et al. eds., 1999).
288. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 264 (1957).
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regional human rights systems may begin to adopt a more punitive ap-
proach.
Although it is possible that particular, narrow holdings in such cases
as Bulacio, Albdin-Cornejo, and Siliadin can well be reconciled with re-
spect to due process rights of the accused, they are nevertheless likely to
create some cognitive dissonance about which model of criminal justice
they represent.29 In other words, regional human rights systems cannot
count on domestic criminal justice systems to be able to process all the
finesse and qualifications of the Courts' positions in particular cases,
where the overall message of the system seems to be that member states
have to strengthen protections for victims. Given that little guidance is
offered on how to reconcile victim protection with preservation of due
process guarantees and given also that many domestic justice systems
have little experience in respecting the rights of the accused, this mes-
sage of empowerment for victims might come across as the message that
the rights of the accused can and perhaps even should be limited.
3. Empowering States Rather than Victims
Recognition of a state duty to protect individuals from attacks on
their rights by other private actors exposes to government regulation es-
sentially all spheres of social life that were traditionally thought of as
private, not only allowing but requiring state intervention. This is not
necessarily a desirable outcome for those concerned about protection of
individual rights from government interference. 290 For example, the crea-
tion of the European constitutional duty to criminalize exposes many
spheres of private life not to "soft" regulation along the lines of family or
contract law but rather to blunt commands and prohibitions of criminal
law backed by the possibility of criminal punishment. In other words,
human rights law mandates the use of the most intrusive forms of
government intervention 29' into the private sphere without giving gov-
289. For a view of models of criminal process as "normative guides to what values ought
to influence the criminal law," see Roach, supra note 63, at 672.
290. Timothy Macklem, Vriend v. Alberta: Making the Private Public, 44 McGILL L.J.
197, 208, 225-27 (1999). For instance, if domestic violence is seen as a human rights viola-
tion, then new legislation and proactive measures are necessary in the domestic sphere to
protect women from this violation. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Vio-
lence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1129 (1995) (arguing that "if violence
against women in the home is inherent in all societies, then it can no longer be dismissed as
something private and beyond the scope of state responsibility"). In most cases, such interven-
tion might be obviously necessary and uncontroversial. However, too zealous an effort to
protect certain values might undermine other values.
291. As previously discussed, constitutional restraints on criminalization are an impor-
tant guarantee of basic rights and freedoms because the power to criminally investigate and
punish is the ultimate, most serious power that the state can exercise over an individual. Au-
thors of the U.S. Constitution viewed identified tyranny with abuse of criminal law by the
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emments the authority to devise other, less intrusive legal measures.
Admittedly, legal regulation designed to protect rights almost inevitably
restricts the freedom of others in some way. But criminal law wields as
its tools the most severe restrictions on individual freedom and for this
precise reason is to be used with restraint. Uniform criminalization rules
might be especially dangerous if adopted on the international level with-
out taking into account local cultures and circumstances of local life.
Excessive reliance on law might even undermine genuine efforts to
solve the social problems that the law seeks to address.2 92 For example,
the concern is often expressed that criminalization is treated as the only
way to address certain social problems, rather than as a supplement to
social and economic measures. The European Court of Human Rights,
which has extensive criminalization jurisprudence, has no track record of
recommending extensive social measures to address certain structural
problems affecting the European Convention rights in member states. In
other words, the Court is putting too much emphasis on and faith in
criminal law measures as a way of securing rights under the European
293Convention.
It has also been argued that criminalization might actually disem-
power victims because once an act is made a crime rather than a civil
wrong, a victim might lose control over its prosecution, since in most
legal systems the control over prosecution would shift to the state.
British King. LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 280 (2d. ed. 1985)
(1973). In international human rights doctrine and law, too, the possibility for abuse of crimi-
nal law has always been seen as one of the most problematic areas, which gives rise to many
opportunities to limit rights. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal
Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in Na-
tional Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 253-54 (1993). Desire to punish acts
we find reprehensible is an inherent human desire dictated by a sense of justice, social solidar-
ity with victims, and a need to preserve the basic values of our society from attack. It is
exactly because there is social demand for punishment, however, that constitutional restraints
on the power to punish were invented. An avidity to punish is dangerous to liberty because it
leads a nation "to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws." 2 THE COM-
PLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588, 688 (1992) (P. Foner ed., 1945), quoted in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is one of
the reasons why no modem national constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing rights of
those harmed by crime but virtually all contain more or less extensive rights guaranteeing the
rights of criminal defendants. Fletcher, supra note 219, at 551.
292. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 65-66 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (characterizing some arguments of contemporary human
rights activists and advocates as "neoformalism" motivated by belief in "absolutes" outraged
in a particular context rather than by analysis of policy options and constructive problem-
solving approaches).
293. See Holly Cullen, Siliadin v. France: Positive Obligations Under Article 4 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 585 (2006); Cesare Pitea, Rape
as a Human Rights Violation and a Criminal Offence: The European Court's Judgment in
M.C. v. Bulgaria, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 447 (2005).
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Moreover, punishment of the offender, even if achieved, might not rem-
edy the situation of a victim in a concrete, tangible way. Enforcement by
public prosecutors might also empower the prosecutors rather than vic-
tims.294
4. Appearing Inconsistent
The increased recognition of victims' rights combined with continu-
ing commitment (in theory) to the traditional due process approach
creates at least an appearance of inconsistency. Legitimacy in human
rights systems requires that the systems do not violate, or even appear to
violate, their own principles. Legitimacy is particularly important for
human rights tribunals whose power to affect government behavior de-
pends crucially on the force of their moral authority, which in turn
depends in large part on coherence.9 Any appearance of a lack of integ-
rity undermines this authority and is dangerous for the long-term
interests of human rights' protection. Legitimacy becomes gradually
more problematic as human rights courts develop their jurisprudence and
in doing so depart from the clear textual authority of major international
• ° 296
human rights instruments.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, already
stands accused of developing a system of jurisprudence akin to the sys-
tem of "enemy criminal law" where two different systems of legal
protections exist, for common criminals on the one hand, and for those
committing crimes on behalf of the state on the other.297 The concepts
294. Donna M. Gitter, Comment, French Criminalization of Racial Employment Dis-
crimination Compared to the Imposition of Civil Penalties in the United States, 15 CoMP. LAB.
L.J. 489 (1994) (criticizing on these and other grounds the French legislation that criminalized
racial employment discrimination rather than making it a civil cause of action, as the United
States law does); Deborah Gartzke Goolsby, Comment, Using Mediation in Cases of Simple
Rape, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1183 (1990); Nora West, Note, Rape in the Criminal Law and
the Victim's Tort Alternative: A Feminist Analysis, 50 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 96 (1992)
(arguing for treatment of non-violent acquaintance rape in most cases primarily as a tort rather
than as a crime); Press Release, Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin, Statement Re-
garding Canadian Customs and Legal Approaches to Pornography (1994), available at
http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/OrdinanceCanada.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2009).
295. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3, 15-19, 135-
42 (1990).
296. Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1832, 1854-55 (2002) (describing the process of "overlegalization" which consists in
part of international institutions reading into treaty texts additional obligations which states
parties did not anticipate when agreeing on these texts). Overlegalization, according to Heifer,
may lead to backlash undermining the states' willingness to participate in international ar-
rangements. Id. at 1836.
297. Basch, supra note 26, 217-21. Admittedly the concept of enemy criminal law is
only selectively applicable here. There is a parallel between the current trends in international
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surrounding the enemy criminal law acquire currency by invoking hu-
man rights rhetoric, primarily through the so-called right to security.2 98
To protect its legitimacy the system must be able to show a principled
basis for this differential treatment. International human rights adjudica-
tion will fail to be an effective guide in domestic criminal justice reform
unless it addresses the issues facing domestic criminal justice systems as
a whole and not on case-by-case basis. It should not, as it currently does,
create different rules for different people without articulating the general
principles which would provide meaningful guidance for criminal justice
systems and their reform.
Any appearance of inconsistency might undermine the perceived
fairness and legitimacy of the human rights systems unless the value
conflict inherent in the recent developments is confronted openly and
resolved in some manner. Human rights systems cannot effectively per-
form their role as educators if they are themselves open to accusations of
applying double standards, inconsistency, or at the very least ad hoc rea-
soning. In addition, the double standard is particularly damaging in a
field of law where the idea of universality is so important for the moral
power of law.
All of this suggests that we should cure the logical inconsistencies
developing in the evolving human rights jurisprudence regarding vic-
tims' rights and accountability for human rights violations before they
raise suspicion that there is a conflict between principles and practice in
human rights courts.
C. In Search of Reconciliation: Power Balance as the Value Underlying
the Due Process and Victims'Rights Models
Even if one recognizes the dangers of the punitive victims' rights
model for the development of international human rights law, one should
also recognize the benefits and inevitability of recognition of victims'
rights in human rights law. Despite the concerns previously discussed,
recognition of victims' rights developed as an answer to very real prob-
lems facing international human rights systems. The central problem in
victims' rights jurisprudence and Jakobs' idea of enemy criminal law in that human rights
courts seem to be creating two parallel systems of laws: one for common criminals and an-
other for those accused of human rights violations. However, the premise of enemy criminal
law as developed by Jakobs also requires that those treated as enemies threaten the very basis
of the political and legal system. This characteristic is not always applicable for those accused
of human rights violations, who often, on the contrary, represent the forces purporting to save
or protect the state. ALEXANDRA BARAHONA DE BRITO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZA-
TION IN LATIN AMERICA: URUGUAY AND CHILE 38-39 (2001); PEREIRA, supra note 22, at 18.
298. G6mez-Jara Diez, supra note 105, at 537-38.
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this respect is impunity for those who order and perpetrate very serious
human rights violations with state sanction or silent approval.2
As the traditional due process model recognizes, abuse of the state
power to punish is a significant source of human rights violations. How-
ever, weak criminal law institutions can undoubtedly also trigger abuses
against human dignity. Extensive literature on failed states illustrates
this. ° Even though the exercise of coercive authority by law enforce-
ment is the evil which a free society must accept, TM it is the veiled threat
of violence that helps make daily life nonviolent 43
This means that the values essential to the protection of victims'
rights have to be accounted for, incorporated into the human rights juris-
prudence, and reconciled with the rights of the accused. As the preceding
discussion shows, not only particular procedural institutions and provi-
sions, but the entire message and the value system underlying the human
rights jurisprudence in due process and fair trial matters needs to be re-
vised in a systematic way.
The rights of victims and the accused require balancing and recon-
ciliation. Such balancing and reconciliation will be difficult unless the
conflict is acknowledged and discussed openly rather than "swept under
the rug" of general proclamations to the effect that everybody's rights
have to be respected. The right to have somebody punished, which is
increasingly recognized by human rights courts, is difficult to reconcile
with the right not to be wrongfully convicted, 03 which is sometimes di-
rectly acknowledged by human rights instruments.3
In addition to a more open acknowledgment of the emerging conflict
the effective reconciliation of these rights requires the development of an
overarching model that can account for the conflicting values involved in
protecting the rights of the accused and the rights of victims. This model
299. For a number of reviews of theoretical and practical implications of impunity in
different regions of the world, see IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 144. See also K.G. KANNABIRAN, THE WAGES OF IMPUNITY: POW-
ER, JUSTICE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2-12 (2004) (discussing the problem of impunity in India).
300. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE
21ST CENTURY X, 92 (2004); Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights, Power, and the State, in MAK-
ING STATES WORK: STATE FAILURE AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 59 (Simon Chesterman
et al. eds., 2005).
301. Richard R.E. Kania, Foreword to VANCE McLAUGHLIN, POLICE AND THE USE OF
FORCE: THE SAVANNAH STUDY xi, xi (1992).
302. ALVIN TOFFLER, POWERSHIFr: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE AT THE
EDGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 15 (1990).
303. Mansoor, supra note 72, at 274.
304. Article 10 of the American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82, provides
that every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event that
he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice.
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should also be able to address the unique needs of international human
rights law (as opposed to domestic criminal law) in this field.
This Article proposes that such a model can be based on the consid-
erations of power balance, which are in fact the underlying
considerations of both due process and victims' rights models.
As shown in Part H, on the very basic level the due process model is
concerned with more than simply the rights of individual defendants for
their own sake. Because the state has such overwhelming power, the due
process model seeks to even this imbalance out to the extent possible by
imposing procedural barriers on the exercise of this power.
Therefore on this more basic level the due process model is con-
cerned with the lack of balance of power between the state and
defendant. This balance is difficult to achieve, even in theoretically ad-
versarial proceedings based on the idea of equality. For this reason the
due process theory believes that special measures are needed to remedy
the de facto disparity that in most cases exists between the state and the
individual accused.3 5 For instance, Packer notes that confessions made in
initial police custody are suspect under the due process model because at
the moment of initial arrest the disparity of resources between the state
and the individual is greatest.3° He also notes that exclusion of such evi-
dence is necessary to prevent police misconduct, in part because much of
such misconduct and abuse will never be prosecuted and punished
through ordinary criminal sanction.307 So, in effect, the exclusionary rule
protecting criminal defendants was designed to compensate for their
powerlessness as victims of police abuse.
However, as many cases reviewed in Part III show, state coercive
power can be and often is held captive to the essentially private interests
of those in power and can fail to reflect genuinely public interest.308 So
the distinction between private and public interests is more complex than
the traditional criminal process models-developed to describe the jus-
tice systems of developed rule of law countries-envisage.
Conflicts within the criminal justice system can occur not only be-
tween the state and the individual, as Packer's models assume, and not
only between the state, the defendant, and the victim, as the victim-based
models assume, but also between state-as-representative of the defendant
and state-as-representative of the victim. That the state can represent the
305. Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
306. PACKER, supra note 36, at 203.
307. Id. at 58.
308. See Gongadze v. Ukraine, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2260.
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interests of the victim has long been acknowledged.3°9 However, state
criminal justice institutions and their officials can in fact identify with
the interests of the accused where he is closer to them by virtue of his
position or social status than the victim. Professor Daniel Brinks in his
empirically based work on police violence in Latin America has shown
that such identification of key actors in the criminal justice system (po-
lice, prosecutors, and courts) with the interests of the accused can cause
both factual and normative shifts in the way cases are processed in the sys-
310tem. The movement of such cases from the first formal complaint to
conviction becomes much more difficult than in more ordinary criminal
cases. According to Brinks, this occurs in part because in cases of police
violence the interests of the criminal justice officials are aligned with the
interests of the alleged offender rather than with the interests of the vic-
tim.
311
International human rights tribunals face these realities and implicitly
understand them. Examples include the understanding of the Inter-
American Court in Veldsquez-Rodrfguez that the state institutions of
Honduras actually directed the people who kidnapped Mr. Vel~isquez.1
The state institutions' interests, therefore, far from being focused on the
punishment of the offenders, lay in their anonymity.
Similarly, in the Bulacio case the judgment of the Inter-American
Court was perhaps based on the belief that the investigators and judges
prosecuting Captain Esp6sito for killing Walter Bulacio had a vested
interest in acquitting the Captain as one of their own. After all, it is pos-
sible that from the perspective of Argentine police, Captain Esp6sito's
only offense was that he had killed a middle-class youth rather than the
usual victim of such incidents, a slum youth.313 The Argentinean justice
system likely saw his punishment as the punishment of one of its own,
for practicing the normal measures of crime control in Buenos Aires.
Such punishment arguably was not in the interests of the system, if it
seeks to continue to use such measures to control crime in the future.t
In other words, this jurisprudence of the Court can be seen as really
about considerations of the balance of power and about the need to rem-
309. VICTIM ASSISTANCE: EXPLORING INDIVIDUAL PRACTICE, ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY,
AND SOCIETAL RESPONSES 130 (Thomas L. Underwood & Christine Edmunds eds., 2002).
This institutional alignment of the interests of the state with the interests of victims as a group
does not mean, however, that state prosecuting authorities always adequately represent the
interests of individual victims. DAVIS, supra note 96 at 63-65.
310. BRINKS, supra note 33, 2-3.
311. Id. AT 26-27.
312. Vehtsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, IN 103,
147(c), 147(d) (July 29, 1988).
313. Id. ! 120.
314. Id. f 90-95.
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edy the excessive dominance of the accused over the criminal justice
system.
There is a similar glimpse of the balance of power considerations in
the following passage from the European Court's decision in Gon-
gadze v. Ukraine.3 5 In that case, the Court held that the lack of
consideration and attention paid by the authorities to the wife of a kid-
napped investigative journalist amounted to inhuman and degrading
treatment under the European Convention. The Court stated:
The Court considers that the facts of the present case show that
during the investigation, until December 2004, the State authori-
ties were more preoccupied with proving the lack of
involvement of high-level State officials in the case than by dis-
covering the truth about the circumstances of the disappearance
and death of the applicant's husband.
16
In other words, the Court found the balance of power anomalous: the
state did not support the interests of the victim by trying to find her hus-
band's murderers but rather stood by the side of potential perpetrators,
trying to exonerate them. This pattern is often repeated in cases of
crimes committed by high-ranking officials.3 7 But it is not limited to
such high-profile prosecutions: routine police violence cases follow the
same pattern.3 The European Court implied that the state identified with
the interests of those accused and in its investigation sought to exonerate
rather than to punish them. The Court then sought to reverse this anoma-
lous situation by holding that the victim's rights had been violated.3 9
Such "anomalous" situations are not foreseen by the due process
model. In modern states most actual use of force by the state is concen-
trated within the criminal justice system; other areas of regulation are
merely reinforced by potential use of this organized violence. 20 Unless
specific control mechanisms are put in place, this force is likely to be
315. Gongadze v. Ukraine, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 179.
316. Id. 179.
317. See, e.g., Bulacio v. Argentina, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100 (Sept. 18,
2003); Mikheyev v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
318. BRINKS, supra note 33, at 31.
319. The European Court found a violation of the substantive and procedural aspects of
Article 2, which required more effective investigation in order to protect the right to life. Gon-
gadze v. Ukraine, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 In 171, 179-80. The Court also found that Ukraine
violated Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) because the protracted
procedures, uncertainty and lack of information about the criminal investigation amounted to
degrading treatment of the applicant in the case (the wife of the dead journalist. Id. 185-86.
The obligation to conduct effective investigation into the death under Article 13 (right to effec-
tive remedy) was also breached. Id. 192.
320. NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed., Eliza-
beth King & Martin Albrow trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985) (1972).
Fall 20091
Michigan Journal of International Law
unleashed against those having least power within the state. To limit this
possibility, classical criminal procedural rules set up a number of institu-
tional barriers, in order to ensure that force is used not arbitrarily, but
according to more or less fair rules prescribed by substantive penal
law."' Among these rules are the presumption of innocence and the stan-
dard of proof (which favor the accused), equality of arms between
prosecution and defense,322 and separation of the prosecution from the
decision-making function.323
It was hoped that these devices would help to put those less powerful
(the accused) on the same level as those more powerful (the state) and
produce fairer results. However, in situations where those without power
seek to engage the criminal justice system on their behalf to enforce the
rules of criminal law against more powerful individuals, these con-
straints are likely to combine with the natural distribution of power
within the system to make it excessively difficult for the powerless to
activate the system and to achieve successfully their aim: actual use of
state force against powerful criminals.
V. THE POWER BALANCE MODEL OF CRIMINAL PROCESS IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Basic Elements of the Power Balance Model
Like the traditional due process model, the power balance model
proposed in this Article seeks to prevent extreme imbalances of power in
the criminal justice system leading to opportunities for abuse. However,
it sees due process and victims' rights as tools in achieving this ultimate
end of balance rather than as ends in themselves. Since the "power" in
the name of the model refers to the state coercive power and the ability
to deploy it, due process guarantees and the rights of victims are
reconciled to a certain extent: they are both mere tools meant to ensure
that there is a relative balance in the use of this power. They are meant to
ensure that this power of the state is not used excessively and at the same
time that it is not underutilized to the detriment of the state's less privi-
321. Eamonn Carrabine, Punishment, Rights and Justice, in RIGHTS: SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 191,200 (Lydia Morris ed., 2006).
322. The principle of equality of arms is safeguarded by Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of
the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the European Court of Human
Rights, this principle means that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to pre-
sent his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-6-vis his
opponents. Dombo Beheer B.V. v. Netherlands, 274 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6, 34 (1994);
see also Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1968).
323. Borgers v. Belgium, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1992).
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leged citizens. There are three logical steps which ought to be made for
the power balance model to work effectively in human rights law.
The first step is to acknowledge the significance of strong, effective
state law enforcement institutions. This step is in no way revolutionary.
The two faces of human rights-which on one hand place limits on state
power and, on the other hand, impose positive requirements of state ac-
tion-have long been acknowledged in international law.3U Similarly the
power balance model assumes that the proper role of the state law en-
forcement apparatus is in even-handedness, which seeks to ensure
equality of individuals in influencing state institutions rather than
"hands-off' neutrality which permits the strong to abuse the weak with-
out state interference.
The second step lies in refraining slightly the way the criminal jus-
tice system is imagined in international law. The traditional view of the
criminal justice system assumes that the interests of the system are radi-
cally opposed to those of an accused and, similarly, that the system's
repressive apparatus is positioned against the accused. However, when
the accused is a police officer, minister, or head of state, who can count
on the protection of state, this view of the criminal justice system may be
inadequate: in this situation, state machinery may operate against the
interests of the victim, who wishes to engage this system against the ac-
cused. The power balance model recognizes the influence that real actors
have within the criminal justice process rather than relying on pre-
conceived notions of a "powerful state" and "powerless accused," as the
traditional model does.
The third step is to reframe our theoretical understanding of the un-
derlying purpose of human rights law in criminal justice. The proposed
power balance model would acknowledge that the purpose of human
rights law is to reverse excessive imbalances of power between different
actors in the domestic justice systems so as to minimize the potential for
abuse of such power-whether through use or non-use. Further, it would
acknowledge that where the state fails to protect individuals within its
jurisdiction through the use of its coercive power, it facilitates the viola-
tion of rights by private actors.
The power balance model assumes that the way to protect these
rights from being violated is to establish both institutional checks on
state coercive power where it is likely that power would be abused and
institutional incentives for the use of this power where the failure to use
it may facilitate violations.
The first element of the power balance model-imposition of proce-
dural checks-is based on traditional due process values and models, is
324. U.N. Human Rights Comm'n., supra note 244, M 6, 8.
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incorporated into constitutional and ordinary criminal law of most states
that proclaim themselves to be democratic, and is expressed in the word-
ing of the main international human rights instruments surveyed in
Part H. The second element-institutional incentives-was developed by
human rights tribunals largely through expansive interpretation of these
international instruments under the influence of the victims' rights
movement and the movement against impunity.
In seeing the two elements as two complementary parts of an over-
arching concern about power imbalance, the model allows for informed
and open discussion of these two trends in international human rights
law. In addition to this explanatory power, however, the model might
also have important prescriptive implications. It has the potential to rec-
oncile many conflicting aspects of its two elements.
It is important to note that the "balancing" underlying the model is
not passive but rather involves an active decisionmaker, who intervenes
and structures the system in a way that restrains the excessively powerful
and lends assistance to the politically or institutionally weak. In the tra-
dition of Herbert Packer, a visual image would be useful to illustrate the
underlying values and purposes of the model: this decisionmaker adds a
weight to previously unbalanced scales, bringing them into equilibrium.
To a certain extent, the name of the power balance model is semanti-
cally related to the principle of equality of arms enshrined in Article 6 of
the European Convention,32 the Inter-American Court's and Commis-
326
sion's interpretation of the American Convention, and in Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2 7 However, the
model is much broader in that it involves not purely procedural rights
within any specific case already underway but also equality in the right
to initiate proceedings. It is also concerned more with de facto equality
than de jure equality.
The power balance model differs from the Packer models and other
alternative models mentioned in Part I in its international orientation. It
is particularly suitable for treatment of criminal justice problems in in-
ternational human rights law rather than in domestic criminal procedure,
in part due to its limited nature. The model does not prescribe uniform
solutions as to how the entire system of criminal law and procedure
should be structured but rather seeks to address those inequalities that
domestic legal systems fail to see and balance. It does not require par-
ticular results but rather recommends structural changes that may make
325. Neumeister, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4.
326. De Carvalho v. Brazil, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 161, 48 (Nov. 28,
2006).




domestic legal systems more capable of producing more equitable re-
sults. While following this principle of balancing would certainly be
necessary in the domestic context, it would not be sufficient as the guid-
ing principle of the adequate model of criminal process. The principle of
balance is only concerned with correcting the most obvious imbalances
of power and is not in itself sufficient to answer many of the key ques-
tions facing domestic criminal justice systems.
This might allow the power balance model to meet a unique chal-
lenge facing international human rights institutions: although
international courts encounter a variety of legal systems and situations,
they must address and respect the inner workings of each. They must
also develop consistent, clear, and easy-to-communicate jurisprudence,
in addition to addressing individual claims. It would appear that the lim-
ited nature of the power balance model would make it well-suited to
meet the unique needs of international human rights tribunals.
Another distinctly internationalist aspect of the model is that it is
targeted toward countries that have difficulty upholding the rule of law.
While the due process model assumes a strong, well-functioning modern
state, the power balance model recognizes that many states fall far short
of this ideal. They struggle with corrupt, unaccountable, and undisci-
plined institutions. It is for such institutions that the power balance
model works best. Unlike Packer's and other models, which assume that
states work as they are supposed to work in liberal theory, the power bal-
328ance model assumes that things fall apart.
B. Practical Implications of the Model and New Punitiveness
in International Human Rights Law
The two elements of the power balance theory, the checks on the co-
ercive power of the state and the incentives for use of the coercive power
when the interests of offenders are aligned with the state, would have
certain specific practical consequences.
Thefirst element would require preservation of all the key aspects of
the traditional due process protections for criminal defendants in all cas-
es. The second element would require human rights institutions to
distinguish between two categories of cases: (1) those in which the ac-
cused is an ordinary citizen, and (2) those in which the accused is a state
official, security or police officer, etc.
328. The difference has been well illustrated in the empirical study of judicial response
to police killings conducted by Professor Brinks. He identified significant differences in offi-
cial reactions to alleged illegal killings committed by police officers between Uruguay, the
country with substantially better developed government institutions, on the one hand, and
other Latin American countries he studies, Argentina and Brazil. See BRINKS, supra note 33, at
87-88, 184, 186, 192.
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In the second category of cases, while traditional due process guar-
antees should be preserved (the first element of the model), structural
measures that would put more force behind the efforts to prosecute the
accused should also be implemented, since the perpetrators' interests are
likely to be aligned with the interests of justice system officials.
In other words, where the second element is concerned, cases that
correspond to the traditional view of the distribution of power in the
criminal justice system (that is, involved a strong state aligned against a
powerless criminal) would be treated differently from those cases in
which the interests of the state are likely to be aligned with those of the
criminal. In the latter category of cases involving crimes by official and
unofficial state agents, international human rights tribunals should evalu-
ate whether domestic justice systems have sufficiently introduced
measures that remedy existing power imbalances and achieve actual
equality of arms in procedures.
Measures that would increase the institutional force propelling in-
vestigation and prosecution comprise two groups: (1) creation of
institutional mechanisms that would empower victims and provide them
with necessary resources to pursue criminal and non-criminal remedies
against the offenders and (2) creation of institutional incentives for state
criminal justice institutions to pursue more actively the interests of vic-
tims in situations where the existing institutional biases would work
against the victim and in favor of the offender.
The first group of measures might require the shifting of attention in
some cases from criminal to civil, 2 9 administrative, and disciplinary
sanctions, which would allow more active participation of the victim in
the process and remove certain barriers for application of sanctions (for
example, longer statute of limitations periods). 330
For example, professional associations of judges and prosecutors
should be encouraged to discipline more often their members who
facilitate impunity by, for example, refusing to investigate the crimes of
security forces. Rules of res judicata and similar legal institutions, which
in some countries prevent civil liability in case of unsuccessful criminal
329. Gitter, supra note 294, at 526 (arguing that civil remedies may be more useful to
victims because of the greater control the victim exercises over civil action than over criminal
prosecution, and because civil standards of proof may be substantially easier for victims to
meet).
330. CoE, COMM. OF MINISTERS, SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: iST ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 37 (2008) [herein-
after Committee of Ministers' 2007 Report] (reporting substantial extension of prescription




prosecution"' might need to be relaxed in order to allow victims to pur-
sue civil and administrative remedies against offenders even if criminal
prosecution is unsuccessful or stalled. Another possibility is opening of a
supervening prosecution channel in cases where the normal procedure
fails to produce an effective prosecution. Reopening of proceedings may
in some cases run into constitutional problems, such as double jeopardy
(non bis in idem). These constitutional rules might have to be reinter-
preted or relaxed to allow greater maneuvering for victims of human
rights violations. But even such constitutionally unproblematic measures
as providing victims with greater opportunities to appeal at the stages of
preliminary investigation and the decision to prosecute could make a
substantial difference in many cases.
Other empowerment measures could include expansion of legal aid
programs for victims, and in particular victims of police and other state-
sponsored violence.332 Procedural opportunities for victims to participate
in investigation and trials should also be improved. Public interest
groups representing and supporting victims of such crimes should be
cultivated and funded.333
The second group of measures might involve creation of separate bod-
ies responsible for investigation of criminal allegations against police
officers and security personnel, and establishment of goals for such offices
as to the minimum overall number of prosecutions brought. Alternatively
states could empower authorities outside the criminal justice system to
investigate and charge crimes committed by the actors within the system,
primarily police officers. For example, such limited powers could be
granted to public oversight boards, human rights directorates, or commis-
sions supervising the work of the police and military personnel, or to
ombudspersons" Changing jurisdiction might also be advisable so that
there is a procedure available for victims to require investigation and
331. See Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (discussing such restrictions in
Turkish law).
332. Jackson, supra note 286, at 743 (noting that strong defense representation might
more effectively reverse the balance in favor of prosecution in criminal cases than evidentiary
rules).
333. BRINKS, supra note 33, at 5, 27, 140, 246.
334. Committee of Ministers'2007 Report, supra note 330, at 28-29 (concerning general
execution measures in the Velikova v. Bulgaria group of cases). An ombudsman or ombuds-
person is an independent official charged with responding to complaints about administrative
or law-enforcement agencies. Ombudsman offices can be nationwide, regional or agency-
specific. LINDA C. REIF, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 25-28 (2004); see also Elizabeth Leeds, Rio de Janeiro, in FRAC-
TURED CITIES: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, URBAN VIOLENCE AND CONTESTED SPACES IN LATIN
AMERICA 23, 33-34 (Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt eds., 2007) (discussing the institution of
police ombudsman in Brazil).
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prosecution of certain crimes to be conducted by authorities in another
region or with different administrative affiliation.
Some such measures are already being advised by human rights
institutions facing problems of impunity for semi-official crimes. The
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which supervises the
execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights335 has
recommended to states a number of general measures that would facili-
tate prosecution of official crime.336 All of the measures advised by the
Committee of Ministers appear to be in keeping with the power balance
model. They encourage states to adopt institutional incentives to more
effectively pursue investigations in cases where the suspected perpetra-
tors are the agents of law enforcement and security forces and whose
interests are aligned with the interests of the state against their (usually
lower-class) victims. These measures also do not focus excessively on
criminal law, but rather provide other accountability mechanisms and
focus on prevention in addition to punishment.
These measures encouraging accountability should be implemented
only in those cases where the alleged perpetrator of a crime is likely to
be protected by the state criminal justice system. However, international
institutions should not normally intervene in cases involving ordinary
crime where the accused is not associated with the state or its law en-
forcement institutions. This is because in most common criminal cases,
domestic political and organizational pressures normally will ensure that
the power of the state outweighs that of the individual defendant.337
The suggestion of different treatment of different categories of cases,
victims, and offenders may be questioned as contradicting the principle
of equality before the law. However, power balance model is based on
the classical Aristotelian proposition of justice, which posits that similar
335. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 46.
336. For example, in cases where the European Court of Human Rights found violations
of Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention (right to life and right to freedom from torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment respectively) the Committee has recommended and states
have undertaken to implement a number of such measures. See, e.g., Committee of Ministers'
2007 Report, supra note 330, at 41 (instituting statutory compensation schemes for ineffective
investigation of crimes as a general execution measure in Pereira Henriques v. Luxembourg);
id. at 39 (revising laws to provide for longer statutes of limitations for cases of police abuse
and torture, instituting general execution measures in the Batie v. Turkey group of cases); id. at
42-43 (introducing legislative reforms to limit parliamentary and other sorts of status-based
immunities-for example, immunity of judges and prosecutors---constituting barriers to inves-
tigation of human rights violations, general execution measures in Giinddr v. Turkey); id. at 36
(establishing independent civilian investigative units responsible exclusively for the prosecu-
tion of criminal offences committed by police officers and members of security forces, and
instituting general execution measures in Matko v. Slovenia); id. at 34 (firing supervising pros-
ecutors for their failure to prevent torture, individual execution measures in Mikheyev v.
Russia).
337. See supra Part I.
[Vol. 31:157
Prosecuting Torturers
cases should be treated similarly. The power balance model highlights
the fact that certain categories of cases and defendants are not similar
and are indeed strikingly different in important respects, and that doing
justice in these cases requires this different treatment. However, this dif-
ferent treatment is based on the equal application of a uniform principle:
the need to prevent and remedy extreme imbalances of power.
Application of the model would have wide implications for the way
in which the state and its criminal justice machinery are conceived in
international human rights law. The model moves away from end-result
tests in victims' rights cases before the human rights tribunals. Just as the
limitations on the state coercive power imposed by the due process
model are mostly procedural, the institutional incentives on the use of
this power should be largely procedural as well. As a practical example
of this procedural orientation, the rights of the accused are protected not
by the abstract requirement that no innocent be convicted of any crime
but rather by the procedural safeguards against mistaken convictions.
Accordingly, no reasonable system of law may require that every crimi-
nal, even if he is labeled a human rights violator, be punished .
The power balance model also counsels against excessive reliance
on criminal law in attempting to prevent the excessive imbalances and
abuse of power against victims.
The first reason for this is the fact that criminal law and its proce-
dures are primarily state-rather than victim-controlled and do not
empower the victim or give her control. Criminal law, as it is conceived
in most contemporary societies, is public law, and the responsibility for
its administration lies overwhelmingly in the hands of state officials. De-
spite numerous efforts to increase the procedural role of victims and
attention to their concerns, the fact remains that in most criminal justice
systems the state has almost exclusive responsibility for the administra-
tion of criminal law.
In practical terms this means that the increased use of criminal sanc-
tion by necessity involves the need for larger criminal justice institutions.
Stronger criminal justice institutions are in high demand in many socie-
ties. But where existing systems are prone to excessive use of power and
poorly controlled, the addition of another, internationally mandated
group of duties is unlikely to result in increased efficiency. It might lead,
338. Statistical evidence of the number of prosecutions and convictions can be used to
illustrate the efficiency of procedures, as the practice of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe suggests. See, e.g., Committee of Ministers'2007 Report, supra note 330, at
35. For example, while supervising the execution of the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in Mikheyev v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), the Committee of Ministers re-
quested that Russia produce statistical evidence of the use of sanctions against persons
accused of violations to prove the effectiveness of such sanctions. Id.
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instead, to more opportunities for abuse. Also, such measures fail to em-
power victims in meaningful ways or give victims greater control of the
remedies they can pursue. It is for this reason that greater use of non-
criminal, in particular civil tort sanctions, and more efficient disciplinary
mechanisms should be at least considered before increased use of crimi-
nal law is recommended.
The second reason is more practical. Many of the procedural guaran-
tees of criminal procedure, which the power balance model would be
unwilling to sacrifice (see first element of the model), inevitably make it
difficult to convict the defendant. Excessive reliance on criminal sanc-
tions would require expansion of prosecution capabilities and would
make accountability more difficult, whereas increased availability and
reliance on civil sanctions makes accountability more likely.
C. How the Model Works: Applying the Power Balance
Model to Actual Human Rights Cases
In addition to its explanatory role, the power balance model is pre-
scriptive and seeks to provide guidance to international human rights
institutions as to how to address dysfunctions and failures in domestic
criminal justice systems while being coherent in their treatment of the
rights of victims and the accused. To illustrate how the power balance
model could be applied prescriptively in actual cases before international
human rights institutions it might be useful to look at how the cases re-
viewed in Part III would be decided applying the principles of the power
balance model.
In the Inter-American system the Veldsquez-Rodrfguez, Barrios Al-
tos, and Bulacio cases would probably be decided the same way under
the power balance model. In Veldsquez-Rodr(guez and Barrios Altos
there was a very strong indication that the crimes in question were com-
mitted by state agents as a matter of state policy. In such cases the
interests of the state were likely aligned with those of the accused, creat-
ing a severe power imbalance between the victim and the accused. The
intervention of human rights law and institutions should be aimed at re-
medying this imbalance to the maximum extent possible. The holdings
showed that human rights institutions can do so in two ways: by shaming
national authorities into more actively investigating and prosecuting the
crimes (Veldsquez-Rodrfguez) and by assisting national authorities to
remove artificial barriers to prosecution erected by the perpetrators
themselves that frustrate the criminal justice system (Barrios Altos).
Although the outcome in the Bulacio case would probably also have
been largely the same under the power balance model, the reasoning
would have been substantially different. Rather than holding that all re-
[Vol. 31:157
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strictions on prosecution were inconsistent with human rights norms, the
Court would likely have limited its holding to the cases involving law
enforcement personnel, who the model assumes the state favors. In doing
so, it would have highlighted rather than camouflaged the need for spe-
cial treatment in cases in which the criminal justice system identified
with the interests of the offender, and would have avoided categorically
invalidating all restrictions on prosecution.
The holding of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Albdn-
Cornejo likewise would have required substantial modifications to be
consistent with the power balance model. Since the persons who alleg-
edly committed malpractice in that case were not state agents and were
not associated with the criminal justice system,339 the power balance
model would not recommend that their case receive special treatment.
However, the court would likely have found violation of the American
Convention in the state's failure to conduct disciplinary investigation or
provide civil remedies.
The same principle would apply to the cases from the European human
rights system. In such cases as Aksoy and Abdilsamet Yaman the European
Court's insistence on effective investigation and non-applicability of time-
bars for prosecution was justified because perpetrators of the crimes were in
all likelihood state agents. In those cases the interests of the state were likely
aligned with those of the criminal accused and against the victim. Under a
power balance framework, the European Court properly threw some weight
behind the claims of the victim against the accused.
Siliadin v. France,34° by contrast, would have been decided differently
in light of the power balance model. The balance established in the case by
the national authorities appeared to be rather adequate. The case was in-
vestigated effectively, the victim's accusations were taken seriously and
vigorously prosecuted, her concerns were addressed, she received com-
pensation, and substantial liability (even though of non-criminal nature)
was imposed on the offenders. The European Court intervened only to
require that a special criminal sanction be introduced for the offense of
exploiting forced labor. However, this intervention was not necessary to
preserve the balance of power between the victim and the accused under
French law. Indeed, the European Court's insistence on criminal rather
than civil remedies for individuals exploiting forced labor may have cre-
ated inequitable distributions of power. In Siliadin the Court sided not
with the unpopular defendants but rather with the politically powerful
prosecutors who benefitted from understandably strong public sentiment
339. The defendants in Albdn-Cornejo were physicians working at a private hospital.
Albdn-Comejo v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171, 2 (Nov. 22, 2007).
340. Siliadin v. France, 2005-Vil Eur. CL H.R. 289.
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against human trafficking and exploitation of children, and it pushed for
criminalization of certain activities where civil sanctions arguably would
have been sufficient. Thus the Court seems to have expanded rather than
remedied imbalances built into the domestic system.
In summary, many human rights cases would have similar outcomes
if decided within the framework of the power balance model. However,
the value of the power balance model lies not merely in the outcomes it
would yield, but just as importantly in providing a consistent system of
reasoning and a set of principles reconciling due process and victims'
rights. It provides a clear and principled basis for the different treatment
currently afforded to cases of official and semi-official crime, on the one
hand, and to common crime, on the other hand.
CONCLUSION
The recent expansion of human rights protections for the victims of
human rights violations is overall a positive development. However, the
increasing recognition of victims' rights by international human rights
courts appears to have gone too far. It has led courts to abandon or
downplay their traditional commitment to due process for criminal de-
fendants in favor of supporting increasingly punitive practices based on
the assumption that criminal law can help solve pressing social prob-
lems. Historical experience, particularly in the United States, shows that
once the language of human rights is appropriated by the advocates of
"tough on crime" policies it leads to the development of increasingly
punitive and repressive criminal justice systems. Once the ideas of vic-
tims' rights gain enough political traction, respect for the rights of the
accused tends to suffer. This Article calls attention to the recent pro-
victim bias in international human rights law and the dangers it presents,
particularly in advancing unjustified optimism about criminal law and
criminal punishment as tools of social reform.
Recognition of this danger is a necessary-but not sufficient-
precondition for putting international human rights law back on track.
What is also needed is a clear path for moving forward: protecting vic-
tims' rights while remaining faithful to due process values. The proposed
power balance model offers one such path. It recognizes that the com-
mitment of human rights law to the prevention of abuse of power
underlies the seemingly irreconcilable concerns about due process for
the accused and about the rights of participation and justice for victims.
The model recognizes that the interests of state criminal justice institu-
tions are often not opposed to the interests of the accused, as the
[Vol. 31:157
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traditional due process model assumed, but are rather aligned with the
interests of the criminal against the victim.
The power balance model remedies this blind spot of the due process
approach while at the same time preserving its own key values. It stands
for restraint and skepticism about criminal law in ordinary criminal cases
and at the same time recommends vigorous effort to facilitate prosecu-
tion where the crimes of the state are concerned. It has implications for
both international criminal justice and ordinary criminal cases.
